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Abstract

Education Investments and Returns in Economic Development

This paper reviews several themes in the economic literature on education
and development : (1) intercountry evidence on how income, price, and
demographic constraints govern public expenditures on schools, (2) alternative
conceptual interpretati ons of the relationship between education, productivity ,
and income, (3) uncertaintie s underlying the micro econometric evidence on the
private and social returns to schooling in the labor market, which can
generally be classified as model misspecific ation arising because of either the
omission of appropriate controls or the neglect of potential sources of sample
selection bias, (4) indications of the returns to schooling in nonrnarket
production of child health, education, and fertility control, primarily
associated with the education 0£ women who perform most of these activities in
the home, and finally (5) evidence on how the allocation and management of
public educational resources influence the efficiency with which these services
are produced and the distribution of resulting private benefits among persons.
Many aspects of these relationship s are poorly understood. Because in practice
only a few of the many proposed complicating features of human capital models
can be implemented simultaneou sly, assigning priorities for further research is
imperative. Among the numerous gaps in knowledge surveyed in the paper some
can be closed with focused microeconom etric empirical research using existing
methods, and are likely to occur with the increasing supply of household survey
and census data for low income countries. Other questions remain unanswered
for lack of a specificatio n of the dynamic aggregate interplay between the
supply of investments in the formation of human capital and the modern sources
of the derived demand for the skills that education produces. Progress on this
latter frontier of the field is equally important, but less certain.
This paper was prepared for the Handbook of Development Economics, edited
by H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, to be published by North Holland Publis~ing
Co., Amsterdam, Netherlands . I greatly appreciate the comments on an earlier
draft by J. Behrman, N. Birdsall, C. Griffin, W.E. Huffman, J.L; Moock, T.W.
Schultz, T.N. Srinivasan, J. Strauss and the research assistance of Paul
McGuire and Andrew Yuengert.

I.

Introduc tion and Preview

The record of sustaine d modern growth in real per capita income cannot be
accounte d for by the accumul ation of conventi onal units of physical capital or
by the increase d applicat ion of hours of labor per capita (Kuznets , 1966).1/
The sources of modern economic growth are sought instead in the changing
quality of labor and capital, in the more compreh ensive accounti ng of other
inputs, and in change of organiza tion, policy environm ent, or technolo gy
(Denison , 1962; T.W. Schultz, 1963; Kuznets, 1966).

'While the issues

surround ing the accounti ng of aggregat e economic growth are unresolv ed and
research strategi es in this field remain controv ersial (Grilich es, 1970;
Nelson, 1981), research on various aspects of the microeco nomic relation ship
between educatio n and developm ent has expanded rapidly, forging a consensu s on
question s for study and appropr iate methodo logies to address these question s.
Studies across persons, househo lds, farms, and firms have documen ted, first
generall y in the United States and then in many low-inco me countrie s, strong
empirica l regular ities between educatio nal attainme nt of persons and their
product ivity and performa nce in both market and nonmark et (home) producti on
activiti es.

If these relation ships are causal, and educatio n enhances the

product ivity of labor, it is not surprisi ng that governm ents have shown a
willingn ess to expend a consider able fraction of national income on public
educatio n; neither is it difficu lt to understa nd why parents have set aside an
increasi ng amount of their private income to school their children , foregoin g
also the producti ve contribu tion the children would have made to family income
had the children not attended school.

The expansio n in world demand for

educatio n is, thus, broadly consiste nt with schoolin g investme nts that earn a
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high social and private return.

Empirical microeconomic studies have

./

simultaneously refined and extended the base of evidence that the more educated
do indeed receive more income and produce more output ·than the less educated in
a wide range of activities. (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Jamison and Lau, 1982)\;°fThis
microeconomic perspective explains the motivation of public groups and private
individuals to supply resources to produce schooling services on the
expectation that the rates of return warrant the investment.
If the value of education is thus seen as primarily determined in the
marketplace, and the recent expansion of education is attributed to an increase
in returns to schooling, then the challenge remains to explain why the returns
to schooling have recently been bid up.

What accounts in the aggregate for the

shift outward in the derived demand for educated labor?

What particular recent

developments have boosted the payoff to investing in education, not only for an
elite, but increasingly for the rank and file of the population?

Education is

highly valued not only for males entering the labor force, but for females
whether or not they are likely to work outside the home.

Hypotheses have been

advanced to explain this phenomenon, relating it to the dynamic economic
conditions that create opportunities in the form of disequilibria that are
exploited more effectively by an educated population (T.W. Schultz, 1975).

But

testing these hypotheses that explicate the initial cause for the spread of
education is intrinsically difficult.

Mass education may be at the very

origins of modern economic growth, a process that has only in the last fifty
years spread notably beyond Europe, areas of European settlement, and Japan.
This essay surveys a small part of the extensive literature on the linkages
between education, productivity, and development, and assesses several areas
where concerted research might clarify important issues and potentially change
policies.Y

-3An Overview

The expansion of public educational systems worldwide has provided the
average child in every country with increased years of schooling during the.
period 1960 to 1983.1/ The gap between high and low income countries in
educational opportunities has narrowed, relatively and absolutely; the wide gap
between the educational attainment of women and men has also narrowed, on
average.

This chapter presents an economic interpretation of this educational

explosion and what has governed the process.

Most of the growth in public

expenditures on education is attributed to increases in growth of real income
per adult.

The income elasticity of public expenditures on primary and

secondary education are 1.4 and 1.5, respectively.

The declining price of

teacher salaries relative to average incomes is the second major engine of
education growth, which lowers the unit costs of providing schooling to a
growing fraction of the child population.

These tendencies appear to have been

partially frustrated by rapid population growth which increases the proportion
of the population in school ages.

This population growth effect does not

appear to have restrained enrollments at the primary level but eroded the
resources available per student at both the secondary and primary levels.
Certain regions have increased public expenditures on education more
rapidly or more slowly than would have been expected, based on incomes, cost of
teachers, and population distribution.

East Asia and Africa are in this regard

overachievers while South and West Asia and Latin America are investing less in
education than is expected on the basis of this framework.
At the individual level the positive relationship between the education of
a worker and his or her earnings helps to account for the noted expansion of
national educational systems.

Under certain conditions, the proportionate

increase in average lifetime wages associated with a year's education
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approximates an internal private rate of return to investing a year's time in
Many empirical studies confirm the nature of this

that form of schooling.

relationship , and proceed to estimate the private returns to education in
developing countries.

They show that basic primary and secondary schooling

yields private returns between ten and forty percent, and generally somewhat
lower at university or college levels.
between men and women.

No pronounced differences are noted

Much of the returns to schooling for women arise from

their increased productivity in nonmarket production, as evidenced in their
ability to improve the health of family members, produce a more nutritious diet
for the same outlays, and control more effectively their reproduction .
Needless to say, this empirical regularity between schooling and wages can
be approached using a variety of more complicated econometric methods.
Although additional controls and the choice of model structure influence
estimates of the partial association between schooling and wages, the evidence
evaluated below supports the view that private returns to basic education are
substantial .
Few countries charge fees to students for the full cost of providing them
with educational services.

Social returns to schooling after deducting the

unreimburse d public expenditure s on schools are, therefore, lower than the
private rates of return.

Particularly for higher education, where the public

cost of providing a student with instruction may be 50 times larger than at the
primary level, the social rates of return in some developing countries may be
insufficien t to warrant further expansion of subsidized public higher
education.

This is rarely the case at the primary and secondary level.

Management of the educational sector seeks to promote an efficient and
equitable use of public and private resources.

Beyond the broader

generalizati ons that can be applied to the financing and expansion of the
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educatio n sector, there are many country- specifc issues that are not pursued
here.

Most of these issues can be analyzed with econome tric methods where

labor force survey and census data are availabl e for estimati ng the relative
benefits of various types of educatio n, and school input and output data are
availabl e to evaluate the efficien cy of school systems to produce what the
labor market demands in the way of skills.
Problems :

C~nceptu al and Empirica l

The empirica l evidence supporti ng educatio n's effect on factor product ivity
must be approach ed critical ly, however.

At one level, there is innate

skeptici sm born of casual empirici sm and nurtured on the richness of
alternat iye theoreti cal models;

economi sts can propose many models to

accommo date the stylized fact that elites are often relative ly well educated
and relative ly well paid.

At another level, the statisti cal evidence on

educatio n's producti ve roles is never ideal, because data on the "consequ ences"
of educatio n are obtained from populati ons in which educatio nal attainme nt is
not randomiz ed but is itself an economic choice variable .
are rarely able to perform social experime nts.

The social sciences

Therefor e, statisti cal studies

of how educatio n affects individu al behavior and performa nce can be biased or
misleadi ng, because of the nonrando m selectio n of comparis ons groups, the
omission of other factors, the simultan eity among outcomes variable s, such as
wages, and potentia l determin ants of these outcomes , such as job tenure, and,
of course, measurem ent error and flaws of function al form approxim ations that
are assumed in statisti cally estimati ng group differen ces associat ed with
educatio n.
There are also palpable differen ces between the formatio n of concrete
physica l capital and the accumul ation of producti ve skills in schools.

In the

former case, land is improved by drainage or irrigatio n, railways are built,

-6-

and factorie s are construc ted, from which producti ve services are derived that
can usually be

priced in a competi tive marketp lace.

In the latter case,

people of differen t ability attend schools of varied quality, and then they
perform diverse and often incompa rable tasks.

It is frequent ly difficu lt to

infer the margina l product ivity of workers, and the selectio n of those that
report a wage may subtly bias comparis ons.

Other workers may be employed in

producti on teams or families , or within large integrat ed firms where the
product ivity of the individu al is not readily monitore d.

Markets for the

services of labor may not be competi tive in the sense of spot markets that
clear in the short run; labor markets may be further linked to other imperfec t
factor markets, such as those for land and credit, in the case of agricult ure.
(See chapters by Bell and Rosenzw eig in this Handboo k.)

Although similar

problems exist in the evaluati on of the services of heteroge neous physica l
capital, many comparis ons of labor market behavior and outcomes can be
misleadi ng unless care is used to explicit ly deal with the heteroge neity of
labor.

Four distinct ive features of human capital warrant brief discussi on

here.
imply,
Differen ces in property rights between human and physical capital
-~.
that empirica l studies must rely largely on rental market transact ions in the
case of human capital, i.e., wage rates, rather than on both rental and asset
prices in the case of physical capital (Rosen, 1985).

Given the durable

lifetime nature of human capital, this constrai nt on availabl e data is a
serious limitati on for testing theory, particul arly when market lifetime
equilibr ium theories of investme nt are the basis for several influen tial
framewor ks for analyzin g human capital (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1962, 1974).
Long-ter m contract s between firms and workers, or between landlord s and
laborers , may add addition al dynamic incentiv e problems to the labor market
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when informa tion regardin g the effort and product ivity of labor is notably
imperfec t and costly to monitor.

How do these convenie nt micro equilibr ium

investme nt approach es of the human capital traditio n mislead research ers in a
world where disequil ibrium rents are the rule and not the exceptio n?
Preferen ces of workers are likely to intrude on human capital mode.ls of
individu al behavio r, while they are convenie ntly set aside by economi sts in
their analyses of the producti on of market goods and services .

An individu al's

decision on how much time to work in the labor market is dependen t on his or
her preferen ces for nonmark et time or leisure versus preferen ces for the goods
that can be purchase d with market income.

Consequ ently, preferen ces may

influenc e human capital investme nt decision s, unless human capital is assumed
to be specific ally neutral in its producti ve effect on market and nonmark et
activiti es, includin g the formatio n of addition al human capital (Ben-Por ath,
1967; Michael, 1982).
Commod ities that are produced for consump tion within the househol d and are
not readily traded across househol ds will be produced in response to variatio ns
in consumer preferen ces of househol d members (Rosenzw eig and Schultz, 1985). To
avoid these complic ations, it is common to assume that farm-hou seholds produce
for the marketp lace as well as for their own consump tion, and view the labor of
family members as equivale nt to labor hired from or supplied to the market;
this homogen eity of output and labor input permits producti on and consump tion
decision s within the househo ld to be sequent ially optimize d, and greatly
simplifi es empirica l analysis of the behavior of farm-hou seholds (Singh, Squire
and Strauss, 1986).

Hired and family labor may not be perfect substitu tes for

each other in all tasks, because the ease of monitori ng and therefor e
decentra lizing work may differ for these two types of labor (Deolali kar and
Vijverbe rg, 1983).

While the family producti on-consu mption model is attracti ve
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for

the study of farm production of food staples, it seems less appropriate

for the study of the production of untraded goods, such as children, the
schooling of those children, and the health of family members (Rosenzweig and
Schultz, 1983).
Any attempt to measure nonmarket benefits ~f schooling that accrue :within
the domestic spheres of household production is subject to worrisome error,
because of the "social and emotional factors involved" (Kuznets, 1954; 432).
This is one among many reasons that led Kuznets and those who followed him to
exclude household nonmarket production and the housewife's nonmarket
contribution to welfare from their reckoning of national income, valued, to the
extent possible, at market prices.

However, an important feature of

development is the tendency for the market to take over progressively more of
the productive activities carried out initially within the household.

Thus, to

ignore nonmarket production and human capital's contribution to these forms of
production is perhaps a more serious omission in the study of low income
countries, and in the characterizatio n of the process of economic development
in general, than it is in the analysis of growth in today's industrially
advanced countries.
These several differences between physical and human capital, and the
different context of household and market production are real, and are
responsible for some of the indirect estimation methods used in this field that
rely on difficult to test assumptions of functional form and other
identification restrictions.

In situations where many economic and demographic

choices of the household are viewed as jointly and simultaneously determined
over a lifetime, including possibly the human capital investments of both the
parents and children, it is difficult to specify exogenous constraints on which
to base consistent estimates of behavioral relationships or household
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production functions.

Community programs, local prices, and regional

characteris tics derived from outside of the household decisionmak ing unit are,
therefore, increasingly used to identify household choice models (T.P.Schultz ,
1984).

This estimation strategy depends critically, however, on the assumption

that migration does not sort persons according to their preferences for these
regional services, activities, and amenities (Tiebout, 1965; T.P. Schultz,
1983; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1984). This assumption concerning the independence
of migration may not always be defensible in developing countries, where local
health and education programs may differ greatly today, particularly between
rural and urban areas.

Alternative ly, the location of the public sector

programs may also represent a calculated response to unobserved local
environment al conditions or average population characteris tics that the
programs are themselves designed to change.

Examples might be public health

facilities and specific disease control programs that are established to serve
communities with particularly severe health problems.

Yet turning to community

level constraints to help identify the determinants of household behavior is an
attractive means to escape the vicious circle of simultaneity among closely
related forms of household economic and demographic behavior.
In sum, the problems of measurement of productivity are serious in the
nonmarket sector.

Relevant statistical comparisons across persons or

households tend to be subject to many sources of selection bias, that cannot
always be persuasively corrected by available econometric techniques, theory,
and data.

Consequently , the evidence of education's market and nonmarket

productive roles is sometimes fragile, and the working assumptions and
statistical procedures that underlie this evidence need to be closely
scrutinized and affirmed from a variety of methodologi cal perspective s.

-10The outline of the chapter is as follows:

Section II describes the

expansion of the world's educational system both in terms of its inputs of
public and private res·ources and its output of students, and then estimates how
income, price, and population constraints appear to govern this process.
Section III contrasts causal frameworks proposed to-explain-the relationship
between education and productivity, and discusses sources of data to measure
the relationship and discriminate among causal interp~etations .

Section IV

reviews evidence on the market returns to schooling measured for both
entrepreneurs and employees, men and women, and migrants and nonmigrants.
Section IV considers the evidence of schooling's effects on nonmarket
production.

Section V considers the policy issues for development that arise

from the apparent effects of education on economic productivity and the
mechanisms used to finance and manage the educational system.

In the

concluding section VI, questions for further research are reiterated.

II. National Educational Systems: Interpretation of Aggregate Patterns!±/
A distinctive development of the last 25 years is the rapid expansion pf
school systems in all parts of the world.

Despite the unprecedented rate of

growth in the population reaching school age, enrollment rates at these ages
have increased in virtually every country.

These developments are examined in

this section to understand their origins and how economic and demographic
factors may be governing this rapidly growing dimension of world investme~t.
Inc·omes, relative factor prices, production technology, and demographic
structure are interrelated in a production-dema nd framework as constraints and
conditions affecting the costs of, and demands for, educational services.

t

Data

for 89 countries from 1960 to 1980 are then used to test quantitatively
hypotheses within this framework.

Differences in school enrollment between
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males and females are also analyzed.

Finally, regional deviation s in

education al expenditu res and achieveme nts are calculated , based on the fitted
model, to document

departure s from internatio nal patterns.
Vorld Trends

Figure 1 summarize s the level and increase in enrollmen t ratios at the
primary, secondary and higher education level for countries grouped by income
level, market/no nmarket economy, and oil exporter status.

For summary

compariso n of overall levels of schooling , a synthetic cohort measure is
construct ed and called hereafter the 'expected years of schooling .'

It is

defined as the sum of six times the primary, six times the secondary , and five
times the higher education enrollmen t ratios; where these weights, i.e., 6, 6
and 5, correspon d to the average number of single-ye ar age groups combined in
the denominat ors of these three standardiz ed enrollmen t ratios.

This new

synthetic cross-age measure of expected years of exposure to the education al
system should not be confused with a cohort measure of completed years of
schooling , which also excludes years that are repeated or not accredited .
Expected years of schooling increased 32 percent from 1960 to 1981 in the
low income class of countries ; 46 percent gains were achieved in the middle
income countries who imported oil, and 50 percent gains occurred in the upper
middle income class.

The East European non-marke t countries increased their

expected years of schooling by 35 percent, while the industria l market high
income countries advanced 16 percent.

Oil exporters in the middle income class

achieved a doubling of expected schooling levels, while nearly a fourfold
increase was reported in the high income oil exporters .
In general, the p·ercentag e gains in schooling were greater for those
countries that started from a lower income level in 1960.

The gap in expected

years of schooling between the low and high income countries is therefore

Figure 1
Expected Years of School Enrollments, by School Level for Groups of Countries: 1960 and 1981
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-12an absolut e
closing , on average , whether express ed in relativ e terms or even as
of
differe nce in years, which more adequa tely reflect s the econom ic value
be at
educati on. This closure in the absolut e gap in educati on appears to
life
least as rapid as that achieve d in health, analogo usly summar ized by
expecte d
expect ation at birth . .21' Figure 2 shows the corresp onding figures for
nal
years of enrollm ents for males and females , summar ized by cultura l-regio
decreas ed
areas; differe nces between enrollm ents of males and females have also
marked ly and warran t an explana tion.
country
The salien t fact is that all classes of countri es, and indeed every
ed over
for which overall compar isons can be drawn from 1960 to 1983, increas
child,
these years the expecte d schooli ng that it provide d to the 'averag e'
childre n
despite the extraor dinaril y rapid growth in the number of school- aged
the ages of
in many of the poores t countr ies.W The number of childre n between
1980.
6 and 17 more than doubled in the less develop ed regions from 1950 to
t in
The propor tion of the popula tion in these ages increas ed from 24.5 percen
that have
1950 to 29.1 percen t in 1980. That the poores t countri es and those
eless
suffere d actual decline s in their real income in this period were noneth
an
able to expand their schooli ng systems rapidly enough to accomm odate
increas ing fractio n of their childre n is remarka ble.
Howeve r, a less sanguin e picture of recent educati onal progres s emerges
from expend iture data assemb led in Table 1 from World Bank sources .

Centra l

prices,
governm ental expend itures on educati on, when express ed in constan t GNP
have decline d in many countri es in the past decade.

Resourc es allocat ed to

marked ly in
educati on per capita by central governm ents appear to have decline d
and
real terms in the lowest income countri es (includ ing or excludi ng India
ng
China) and increas ed by only 22 percen t in the middle income oil importi
countr ies.

In contras t, oil exporti ng middle income and upper middle income

countri es were able to more than double their per capita real public

Figure 2
Expected Years of School Enrollment for Males and Females by Region:
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expenditures for education, while the high-income industrial countries raised
their real outlays on education by 88 percent.
How have the poorer countries sustained increases in enrollments despite
the evidence that central government outlays have not kept pace with population
growth?

One explanation for these divergent trends might be that local, state,

and private expenditures on schooling expanded to replace central government
outlays.

Table 2 reports UNESCO estimates of public school expenditures at all

governmental levels, confirming a decline in real public outlays on schools in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America after 1980.

I cannot assess how the data

underlying Tables 1 and 2 might differ beyond the inclusion in Table 2 of
noncentral government educational expenditures.

Private school expenditures

are not well documented, but the share of private school enrollments is
generally modest and declining in most low income countries (World Bank,
1986a).

Tuition and fees at public schools have also been eroded by inflation

and public policy changes during the 1970s (Jimenez, 1984), though this trend
may have reversed recently.
Another explanation could be that unit costs of producing educational
services declined, as might occur if the school system realized economies

<ii:

scale or incurred a decline in the price of educational inputs relative to fhe
GNP deflator used here.

Alternatively, the quality (or resource intensity) of

schooling services may have deteriorated.
In sum, alternative factors could be behind the decline in government
expenditures on education in some low income countries:

(1) the actual quality

of schooling per student may have declined; (2) the unit costs of production of
educational services of a constant quality may have declined relative to the
general price level (GNP deflator); and (3) the underlying data may be in
error.

The subsequent cross country empirical analysis of public educational

<·

•

":Dlble 2
Pdl1.ic Expenlitmes on Mrati.on :Per CJrl.l.d of Sdlool :,ge, 1970-1982
PUblic Experrlitures per Child 6-17
(Constant 1970 U,S.Dollars)

Percent.age Growth
in Real PUblic
Expen:litures

Percent of
World's
Pcpllation
age 6-17
in 1970

PUblic Experditures on &:lucation
(billions cf current U.S. dcll:u:-s)
1970

1975

1980

1982

1970

1975

1980

1982

on D:iucation
1970 to 1980

Africa, excl\dirq
Arab states

8.0

1.89

5.05

12.1

11.7

23,7

39.5

57.3

44.8

142

Arab states

3.8

1.80

8.44

17.7

22,1

49.0

144.

187.

187.

282

Asia, excl\dirq
Arab states

59.4

12.0

38.3

85.6

89.7

20.2

42.1

60.9

54.2

201

I.atin America

8.5

5.54

14.3

32.8

36.5

65.3

108.

158.

147.

142

Northern America

5.3

71.8

113.

200.

232.

1350.

1570.

2170.

2280.

61

14.7

64.5

146.

252.

224.

436.

714.

909.

703.

108

Oceania

.5

1.98

6.99

10.4

11.4

418.

996.

1010.

931.

142

Develqied* Total

22.5

147.

295.

529.

536.

654.

956.

1260.

1120.

93

Develq;,irq Total

77.5

12.6

37.4

81.9

92.0

16.2

31.3

43.7

41.2

170

World Total

100.

160.

332.

611.

628.

160.

220.

266.

232.

66

Region:

Eu~, ircludin;
Us.sR

Oceania, Nort:h America; Japan, Israel and· south Africa.
UNESCO statistical Yearl:>ook 1984, Table 2.12. GNP deflater for U.S. used to express am:ent dollars (1975: 1.375; 1980:
17 fl'm U.N. ~
1.950: 1982: 2.261): statistical .Abstract of the United States 1985, Table No. 715. POpllation 1qe 6 to1982
and extrapolated to
Irrli.cators of Cgmtries, Fstimates arrl Projections Assessed in 1980, for 1975, 1980 am interpolated to
1970. For Arab States and Africa and Asia excludirq Arab States, UNESOO Statistical Yearl:>ook 1984, Table 1.2, tmifonnly
interpolated fran 5 to 19 age groups to 6 to 17.

*airope,
soorces:

-14systems is restricted to countries for which there are data on enrollments,
teachers, expenditures on current and capital account, estimates of GNP in
constant prices, urbanization, total fertility rates, and the population's age
composition.

The data from this restricted sample of countries are believed to

be more reliable than the comprehensive figures reported above, but possibly
less representative.

Before considering intercountry patterns in these data,

it is useful to have a framework within which to account for variation in the
provision of educational services. The framework involves three parts:

an

interpretation of the political economy translating private demands into public
expenditures, a production technology linking educational inputs to outputs,
and the determinants of household demand for public educational services.
Adjustment of the Educational System to Demand and Supply
Education is demanded both as a consumer good that yields direct utility
and as a producer good that is expected to enhance the future productivity of
the educated individual (T.W. Schultz, 1961).

Private demand of consumer goods

depends on consumer income, relative prices, and tastes.

As a produced means

of production, economists have reasoned that the private and social demand for
education should be an increasing function of its private and social rates of
return (Becker, 1964).

However, the relationship across countries between the

level of returns and the average quantity of schooling represents intersections
of the presumably upward sloping private/public supply function of investment
in education and the downward sloping aggregate derived demand function for
more educated workers. Unless variables can be specified a priori that shift
one and not the other side of this market for more educated labor, it is not
generally possible to identify statistically the individual's investment supply
response function from the aggregate derived demand function for educated
labor.

Most empirical analysis based on consumer demand theory or the human

-15-

capital framework studies the behaviora l response of individua ls or families to
aggregate market-de termined wage rates, prices, initial endowment s, etc.

The

latter are exogenous constrain ts that are expected to partially explain the
individua l response.

At the aggregate level, derived demands for labor of

various types and the aggregate d responses of individua ls to invest in human
capital and supply labor to the market cannot be as readily disentang led or
statistic ally identified .

In the course of economic developme nt both the

aggregate demand and supply schedules are likely to shift. It would be useful
for our purposes if we could specify exogenous endowments to the economy, such
as original natural resource stocks, or exogenous technolog ical dimension s to
the developme nt process that ditfer over time and across countries , that affect
the derived demands for relatively better educated
lower) the producer returns to education .

labor and hence raise (or

However, there is as yet no.

agreement on what these identifyin g variables might be.
In the subsequen t empirical analysis of aggregate school systems, national
income per adult, relative prices, and other technolog ical and demograph ic
constrain ts are tentative ly interprete d as influencin g the individua l and
family's investmen t supply function of education , or, in other words, the
private and public sector demand for schooling services.

But the same income,

price, and technology factors may also shift aggregate derived demands for
educated labor and thereby vary the rate of return to education as a producer
good.l/ The relationsh ips estimated below to explain school expenditu res and
outputs are consequen tly reduced-fo rm equations that may embody the underlyin g
investmen t supply and aggregate demand parameter s.

Identifyin g these.

underlyin g structura l supply and demand parameter s is not attempted here.
Actual estimates of the social rates of return for secondary schooling for
some 40 countries are plotted in figure 3 against lagged secondary school

Figure 3

Social Returns to Secondary Schooling and Lagged Enrollment
Rates: Plot of Available Country Observations
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-16enrollment ratios.

The downward sloping scatter of observations suggests

that

the private/public supply of schooling is shifting to the right over time with
development to trace out, approximately, the downward sloped (and probably also
shifting) demand schedule.

Some countries for which there are available

repeated estimates of social returns confirm the same pattern within a country
of falling social returns as the expansion of school systems overtakes
expanding aggregate demands for more educated labor.

But demand schedules may

also shift more (or less) rapidly than supplies of educated labor, and this
might explain the period of rising returns in South Korea from 1967 to 1~71.
The extreme drop in returns in Peru from 1972 to 1980 may signal the added
impact of a cyclical decline in demand for better educated labor.
A second unusual feature of the educational system is that it produces its
own main input, teachers.

It thereby affects by its past production the

current wage required to retain the services of teachers and consequently the
unit cost of producing further education, other things being equal.

This

feedback effect of output on future unit costs suggests that choosing the best
expansion path for education involves additional issues of intertemporal
optimization and intergenerational equity, topics that implicitly arise in the
educational planning literature, but which remain to be explicitly incorporated
into many empirical analyses (Bowles, 1969; Freeman, 1971).

For example, to

expand a school system rapidly from a very limited national educational base
involves inevitably bidding up temporarily the cost of teachers and may even
require the costly importation of trained personnel.

These high initial costs

of expansion tend to decline as the pool of domestically trained secondary
school graduates increases and these new graduates compete for available
teacher posts.

This decline in the relative price of teachers then encourages,

-17y
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along with rising incomes, more private demand for public education as both a
consumption and investment good.

Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this downtrend in

the relative price of primary and secondary school teachers, most clearly
evident in a number of African countries which.. have recently expanded their
national educational systems.

In middle income -countries, such as·· in Latin - ·

America, the downtrend in wages of at least primary school teachers relative to
that of the average worker is more irregular.

Some part of this decline in the

relative price of teachers may reflect a substitution of women for men in
teaching.
Although there is no established framework for dealing with these dynami'.c
and recursive features of national educational systems, the current wage of
teachers clearly depends on the current level of demand for schooling.
Consequentl y, the price of teachers is endogenous to a model determining the-
demand for educational services.

To estimate without simultaneou s equation

bias the effect of this price on current demand, instrumenta l variable methods
are later adopted.
A Model of the Educational System

The technologic al possibilitie s for producing educational services are
assumed to be identical across countries.

This production function for

educational services is also assumed in the long run to exhibit constant
returns.

This does not seem to be an unrealistic assumption for primary and

secondary school systems.

If the elasticity of substitution between labor·and

capital is one, the production function may be expressed in standard
Cobb-Dougla s form:

(1)

where Xis the output of educational services, Lis the labor input, K is the
physical capital input, and o is the share of wages in output, and 1-o is the
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capital share, while Z is a set of exogenous technologic al shifters that affect
the unit costs of producing schooling in different environment s, but are
neutral with respect to labor and capital productivity and use.
technologic al factor might be the distribution of the population.

One such
Dispersed

populations may incur greater private and public transportati on costs, in terms
of both time and money, to provide the same effective schooling services.

It

is also frequently assumed that rapid population growth, which increases the
school age fraction of the population, strains the capacity of the government
to provide desired school services.
Analyses of the private demand for public goods have generally assumed that
citizens know about the costs of production and the benefits of government
spending (e.g., Borcherding and Deacon, 1972).

The political process is

assumed to be more or less democratic, in the sense that
entrepreneu r-politician s seek 'election' to deliver efficiently the public
goods and services and the associated tax burden that taken together command
the support of a majority of voters . .§/

The essential idea is that public, as

well as private, institutions tend to optimize their input allocation and
production decisions as constrained by consumer incomes and perceived benefits
of outputs, on the one hand, and technologic al possibilitie s and relative input
prices, on the other.
If the educational sector thus minimizes its unit costs, that is, produces
efficiently, the marginal cost or price of schooling services, Px, can be
expressed as a multiplicat ive function of the wage paid labor in the
educational sector, W, and the return, r, required on public capital (e.g.,
Borcherding and Deacon, 1972).

(2)

-19World capital markets are probably more effective than international labor
markets in equalizing factor returns.

If rates of return on educational

physical capital were equalized, the only remaining constraints that would
influence the marginal cost of education across countries and over time are the
real wage paid to teachers, W, and the exogenous technological conditions
denoted by Z.
school systems.

Teacher salaries are most of the recurrent expenses for most
In recent years about 95 percent of current expenses in the

primary school systems of low income countries were teacher salaries, whereas
in high income countries the proportion is about 75 percent (World Bank, 1983;
p. 99).

Current expenditures in a school system divided by the number of

teachers is the rough measure used here of labor costs for the educational
system and is the principal factor determining the relative price of
educational services in a country.

The price equation can be rewritten as the

following, if the rental rate on capital does not vary:

(3)

where Po is a constant, P1 - -1, and u1 is a multiplicative error in the
production technology affecting unit costs.

Because labor's share of

educational expenditures, a, can be observed, the effect of price variation can
be estimated from data on teacher wages (Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982). For
simplicity, educational services are assumed to flow equally to all citizens
who have equal numbers of eligible children to benefit.
Finally, the quantity of schooling demanded by the median voter, q, is
assumed to be log-linear in the tax, t (or price), in the taxpayers' income, r Y,
and possibly in technological factors, Z,

-20-

(4)

where u2 is a multiplicati ve error in the demand relationship .
Expenditure s per school aged child (E/P) are then obtained by multiplying
quantity demanded by price, where the general tax rate is equal to the marginal
price of school services:

(5)

Substituting from the production technology (3) in for the price of educational
services, logarithms are taken of (5) and the partial effects of income per
adult, relative prices (teacher wage), and technologic al shifters on public
educational expenditures per child are expressed as a combination of underlying
household demand and production technology parameters:

(6)

(~ + l)(P 0 ) + ln D,

where

0

b2

a(~+ 1)

b3

P(~ +

1) +

€

The errors from the production technology and household demand relationship s
are combined in v, and are assumed independent of Y and Z.

Knowledge of the

labor share of inputs, a, permits the identificati on of the price elasticity,
~-

The net effect of incomes,

o,

and the Z factors--coh ort size and
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urbanization--o n educational inputs and outputs can also be inferred from:.
estimates of the reduced form equation (6).

Cohort size is closely associated

with lagged fertility and family size, and these demographic outcomes are
inversely correlated with investments in child schooling at the family level.
To distinguish between these factors, the total fertility rate is also included
in the vector of control variables denoted by Z (T.P. Schultz, 1985).
An Empirical Decomposition of Educational Expenditures

The composition of educational expenditures may also vary with price,
income and demographic factors, in addition to the overall level of educational
expenditures.

To evaluate these compositional effects, it is convenient to

divide school expenditures per school-age child into a multiplicative function
of four observable components:

E
p

S T C E
= (-)(-)(-)(-)
P S T C

(7)

The first term on the right-hand side is the ratio of students enrolled to the
number of children of school age, the enrollment ratio, which can be computed
in most countries for boys and girls separately.

The second term is the

.teacher to student ratio, that is treated as one possible indicator of the
human capital 'quality' of schooling (Pryor, 1968; Bowles, 1969; Fuller, 1986),
which may be contrasted with the 'quantity' response in terms of enrollments.
The third term is the current expenditures per teacher.

The fourth and final

term is the ratio of total expenditures to current expenditures, or an index of
the physical capital intensity of the educational system.

Logarithms of the

four component ratios in question (7) are regressed on the same income, price,
technology, and population composition variables used to explain expenditures
per child.

The sum of the log-linear regression coefficients for each

-22conditioning variable in these four component regressions is equal to that
variable's coefficient in the overall expenditure per child function.

In this

way, the effect of income, price, and other factors on overall educational
expenditure s estimated from equation (6) may be decomposed into the additive
effects of each conditioning variable operating on quantity, quality, capital
intensity, and teacher salaries.V
Educational expenditures are deflated to constant local prices using the
GNP deflator and converted to 1970 U.S. dollars according to the prevailing
average foreign exchange rate in 1969-71.!Q/ The 'average' teacher salary is
the public current expenditure s per primary and secondary school teachers,
which is then deflated by national productivity or GNP per working age adult.
This relative price of educational services is determined simultaneou sly with
production costs and consumer demands for schooling.

Unexplained variation in

either production costs (u1) or consumer demands (u2) will thus be correlated
with relative prices.

Consequentl y, instrumenta l variable (IV) techniques are

employed in estimating equation (6) under the assumption that the price
variable is endogenous; the instrumenta l variables are specifically secondary
school enrollment rates, incomes, and urbanization , all lagged ten years.11/
The IV estimates have the additional attraction of being consistent despite the
systematic errors-in-va riable problem that arises because the logarithmic
transformati on of relative prices, incomes, and teacher wages are linearly
dependent.1 2/

Although the auxiliary instrumenta l variable equations for wages

undoubtedly simplify the structural process underlying time series of
educational systems, the relative price of teachers today is, as expected,
inversely associated with the supply of potential teachers trained in the
country in previous decades.13/

-23Income is measured as GNP in local constant prices converted, as are
educational expenditure s, to 1970 dollars, and divided by the population of
Population density is measured as the proportion of

working age, 15 to 65.W

the population living in an urban area.

The relative size of the school-aged

cohort is the proportion of the population age 6-11 for primary school, and the
proportion age 12-17 for secondary school, following UNESCO conventions .
Period fertility is measured by the total fertility rate, which is equivalent
to the sum of age specific birth rates for women age 15 to 49.
Data were first collected for 155 countries with populations greater than
one million in 1983, for each five years from 1950-1980.

Data on all required

series were obtained for at least one year in 89 countries, of which 30 were in
Africa, 19 Latin America, 21 Asia, 2 Oceania, 1 North America and 16 Europe•.
The maximum number of country-yea r observation s was 321 for primary schools and
258 for secondary schools.

In pooling of time series observations from a cross

section, it is clear that all observations are not independent; neglect of
error covariation across observations on a particular country undoubtedly
biases reported tests of statistical significance and may bias estimates as
well.
There are substantial differences across regions in the size and resource
intensity of primary and secondary school systems, which may stem as much from
differences in relative prices as they do from the more widely recognized
differences in incomes.

For example, primary enrollment ratios are 59 percent

in Africa and 95 percent in Latin America, while the teacher student ratios and
capital intensity are similar, .024 and .030, and 1.22 and 1.15, respectively .
Primary school teachers are paid about the same in the two regions, but because
GNP per adult is one third as large in Africa, the relative price of teachers
is fully twice as high in Africa as it is in Latin America.

Expenditure per

primary school aged child is $20 in Africa compared with $51 in Latin America.

-24The potential explanatory role of income and relative prices in determining
school expenditure s and achievements is suggested from even such gross regional
comparisons .

The large differences between enrollment ratios for boys and

girls in Africa compared with Latin America may also stem from economic
differences between regions.

The next section summarizes the fit of the

multivariate production/d emand relationship s across country observations and
discusses the estimated magnitude of price and income effects, as well as the
effects of urbanization and population growth.
Estimates of School Expenditure Equations

Total expenditure elasticities are reported in row 5 of Table 3, separably
for the .primary and secondary school systems.

Rows 1 through 4 in Table 3

report the elasticity of the expenditure components designated in equation
(12).

The income elasticity of total expenditures (6) exceed unity; they are

1.35 and 1.47 at the primary and secondary school level, respectively (row 5,
first column).

The share of income expended on each level of schooling thus

tends to increase with real GNP per adult.

The elasticity of total educational

expenditures with respect to the relative price of teachers is .16 and .24 at
the two school levels (second column).

This implies that the elasticity of the

quantity of school services demanded, approximate ly enrollment, with respect to
the price of labor, or~ in equation (9), is equal to -.80 and -.70 at the
primary and secondary school levels.15/
The components underlying these income and price effects on total public
expenditures per school aged child differ by school levels.

In the primary

schools (top panel Table 3) the income elasticity is about twice as large for
enrollments as for teacher-stud ent ratios: .31 for quantity and .17 for quality
(rows 1 and 2).

The physical capital intensity index is not well explained by

any of the economic or demographic variables (row 4), and may contain largely
transitory variations in capital appropriatio ns or measurement error.

Teacher

Table 3

Fst.imtal El.i¢icity of Sdlool system Em:ollllE.nts aid Iqut:s,
with Respect to <lmxJes in Explanatory Variables

level of School

System

Explanato:ry Variables
Proportion
Relative Relative
of Pcpllation
Price of Size of
Income
School-Aged Urban
Per Mult Teachers
Population

Real

Pr.ilnarv School Ievel:
1. Enroll.nett Ratio (Quantity:S/P)

2. Teacher-Stu dent Ratio (Quality:T/S)
3. Teacher Salaries (C/T)
4. capital Intensity (E/C)
5. Total Expenditure s per
School Aged Child
(6-11) (E/P)

Seooroaty School

1.
2.
3.
4.

.31**
.17**
.87**

-.70**
-.18**
1.05**
-.01

.54*
-.46**
-1.08**
-.12

.16
-.14**
.08*
-.03

1.35**

.16

-1.12**

-.25**

-.96**
.19**
1.02**
-.01

.OB
-.81**
-_.69**
-.23

-.38**
.09
.05**
-.03·

.24**

-1.68**

-.26**

.oo

level:

Enrollment Ratio (Quantity:S/P)
Teacher-stu dent Ratio (Quality:T/S)
Teacher Salaries (C/T)
capital Intensity (E/C)

.43**
.11
.94**
-.01

5. Total Expenditures per

School-Aged Cllild
(12-17) (E/P)

1.47**

.

~Underlyirg regression roefficient is statisticall y significant ly different from zero at the
five-·· percent level.
**Underlying regression roefficient is statisticall y significant ly different from zero at the one
percent level.
'"')
.
'
7 and 8).
Tables
(1985,
Schultz
Source: T.P.
,•,

:.,_

•·1.,:···t.·•.

I
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salaries increase 87 percent as fast as do incomes per adult (row 3),
contribut ing to the large elasticity of the income-ex penditure relationsh ip
(row 5).

Conversel y, the relative salary position of primary school teachers

declines by about 13 percent with a doubling of average income in a country, a
pattern noted over time in figure 4.
At the secondary school level (bottom panel Table 3), the income elasticity
is four times larger for quantity (.43) than for quality (.11).

The price

elasticit y is larger in absolute value for secondary schools than for primary,
-.97 versus -.70.

A decline in the price of school teachers relative to

national productiv ity is associate d with a substanti al increase in enrollmen t
but with only a modest increase in the ratio of primary school teachers to
students and a puzzling decrease in secondary school teacher-st udent ratios.
Urbanizat ion exhibits a relatively weak, but consisten t, relationsh ip with
public expenditu res on schooling .

A country which has ten percent more of its

populatio n in urban areas, with 50 versus 40 percent urban, tends to expend
five percent less on schooling per child, at both the primary and secondary
school levels. These data do not indicate precisely how urban school systems
reduce the public costs of education .

Consolida tion of schools into more

efficient sized units to exploit specialize d teaching functions in more densely
populated areas is often cited as an important source of economies of scale in
public schools.1 6/

Higher populatio n densities could also reduce the private

opportuni ty cost or travel time for students. But the lack of large effects of
urbanizat ion reducing teacher-s tudent ratios in secondary schools, or
increasin g enrollmen ts, suggests that economies of scale or reduction s in
private student time costs may not lie behind this pattern in school
expenditu res.
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The relative size of the school aged cohort, which is highly correlated
with recent levels of population growth, is significantly associated with lower
expenditures per student on primary and secondary schools.

An increase in the

proportion of the population of primary school age by ten percent, from .153 to
.168, is associated with an eleven percent decline in primary school
expenditures per child.

In other words, primary school expenditures do not

increase in response to an increase in the size of the school aged cohort.
There are offsetting tendencies for primary school enrollment rates to increase
for the larger cohorts, whereas teacher-student ratios fall.

Teacher salaries,

in addition, are substantially lower (ten percent) for the larger school aged
cohort, and this appears to be the main factor explaining the lower
expenditures per child.
A ten percent larger cohort is associated with an even larger decline in
expenditure per secondary school aged child, of about 17 percent.

Secondary

enrollments are little affected, but teacher salaries and teacher-student
ratios are notably lower.

Thus, larger birth cohorts do not seem to receive

fewer years of schooling, as attested to by the pattern of enrollment ratios,
but they do appear to receive schooling of lower human and perhaps physical
capital intensity.
This pattern of adjustment in the factor intensity in schools is a
plausible economic response to the relative scarcity of both human and physical
capital in many poor countries recently experiencing rapid population growth.
Much thought has been given to how health care delivery systems might be
encouraged to use less human- and physical-capital intensive technologies in
low income countries, rather than borrow directly the highly capital intensive
(hospital based) procedures used in the industrially advanced high income
countries.

The tendency for low income countries to substitute away from

human- and physical-capital intensive educational production technologies
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appears, therefor e, to be a reasonab le innovati on on economic grounds to
differen t relative factor scarciti es (e.g., Binswang er and Ruttan, 1978; Hayami
and Ruttan, 1971).17 /
Fertilit y, as anticipa ted, is inversel y associat ed with school expendit ures
per child, and this partial correlat ion (not reported ) stems primaril y from the
inverse associat ion between enrollme nt-and .fertilit y, particul arly at the
secondar y level (T.P. Schultz, 1985).

Such a pattern could be expected if

parents substitu te more schoolin g resource s per child for not having as many
children .

But the estimate d relation ship between fertilit y and school

enrollme nts or expendi tures is not statisti cally differen t from zero at the
five percent level, except for primary enrollme nts of girls.

The deletion of

fertilit y from equation (6) leads to slightly larger (more negative ) estimate s
of the effect of cohort size on schoolin g inputs, but the changes are
relative ly small (less than 10 percent) .
Sex Differen ces in School EnrollD ent Rates

Differen ces in the school enrollme nt rates of boys and girls may have much
to do with the level of child mortalit y and fertilit y, the rate at which women
migrate from rural to urban areas, leave family and domestic producti ve
activiti es for employm ents in the market labor force, and in particul ar, for
their increase d particip ation in the nonagri cultural sector, as discusse d below
in section V.

The future economic status of women relative to men appears to

depend heavily on their enrollme nt in school and their ability to benefit
directly from the increase d producti ve opportu nities created by modern economic
growth.
First, the estimate s summariz ed in Table 4 imply that the income elastici ty
is larger for female enrollme nt rates than for male enrollme nt rates:

the

point estimate s for female and male enrollme nt rates are .43 and .24 at the

Table 4
Elasticity of Enrollment Ratios of Females and Males
with Respect to Changes in Explanatory Variables

Enrollment Ratio by
School Level

Real
Income
Per Adult

Explanatory Variables
Relative
Proportion of
Size of
Relative
Price of School-Aged Population
Urban
Population
Teachers
I.

Primary Level:
Females
Males

.43**
.24**

-.76**
- .63**

.65**

-1.01**
-.91**

.98**·

~30

- ;21
-.12

Secondary Level:
Females
Males

.30**

.75
-.34

-.49**
-.30*

*statistically signifir.antly different from zero at 5 percent level.
**statistically significantly different from zero at l percent level.
Source:

T. P. Schultz (1985, Tables 7 and 8).

-28primary level, and .65 and .30 at the secondary level.

These differences in

income elasticity are statisticall y significant at the ten percent level.
Second, the price enrollment elasticities are greater in absolute value for
female than for male enrollments:
-.91 for secondary.

-.76 and -.63 for primary, and -1.07 and

A fifty percent increase in incomes per adult from the

sample mean of $721 (1970 U.S.) would raise primary enrollment rates for girls
from 69 to 83 percent, while the rate for boys would increase from 88 to 97
percent.

The girls would improve their school achievement relative to boys

from .78 to .85.

The 'gender gap' in secondary schools would also in this

scenario close by a fourth, with girls increasing their enrollment rates from
17 to 22 percent, while the rate for boys would increase from 26 to 30 percent.
Reducing the relative price of schooling has a further effect of improving
female enrollments relative to males.

According to these cross sectional

estimates of income and price elasticities , economic development with its
effects on adult incomes and relative wages of teachers is associated with an
equalizing of schooling opportunitie s between boys and girls; these tendencies
are also evident in the restricted sample of less developed countries.

Here

may be a potent dimension of the development process that unleashes demands for
the schooling of girls and young women that in turn play a pivotal role in
governing the timing and pace of the demographic transition.
Religion is often cited as a traditional cultural force that influences the
status of women and their educational opportunitie s relative to men.

Muslim

culture, in particular, is often singled out for its distinctive attitudes
toward women's status, education, employment and, consequently , fertility.
Adding to our framework percentage of the population that is Muslim and the
percent that is Catholic, for example, does not change the above noted patterns
(T.P. Schultz, 1985).

-29Regional Patterns in Residuals

Variation across countries and over time in five variables--incom e per
adult, teacher relative prices, urbanization, size of school cohort, and total
fertility--accou nt for 92 to 94 percent of the variation in expenditures per
child at the primary and secondary •school levels.

.Somewhat less of •.the

variation is explained in enrollment ratios, 38 to 72 percent, respectively.
Half of the wide variation in teacher-student ratios is explained by the model
at the primary level, but only a fifth of the more limited variation in this
qualitative indicator is explained at the secondary school level.

Holding

these five explanatory variables constant, the residuals from the model are
averaged across countries by region and by development status and reported in
Table 5.

Since the educational input and enrollment variables are expressed in

logarithms, the average residuals can be interpreted as the proportion by which
the region exceeds or falls short of that predicted by the model.
Expenditures per primary school aged child are 9 to 14 percent above
average in East Asia and Africa, but 24 percent below average in South and West
Asia.

Enrollment rates at the primary level are also above average in Africa

and East Asia, but 28 percent below average in South and West Asia and 16
percent below in Latin America.

Secondary school expenditures per child are

about 16 percent above average in Africa, and some 18 percent below average in
Latin America.

Enrollment rates at the secondary level show more variation,

with Latin America and South and West Asia again reporting rates below that
which is expected.

In contrast, Africa and East Asia again exhibit enrollment

rates well above expectations.

The teacher-student ratio is above average in

Latin America, but below in East Asia and Africa.

Teacher wages are higher in

regions such as South and West Asia and Latin America which have invested~less
than the predicted amount in secondary schooling in the past.

Table 5
Regirm1 Average Deviati ai of Prlnm:y

am Seanm :y Sdxx>l

fmD ~ Pn!dicte d

Ewpenli tums

am 0Itp1ts
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Fast

Africa

America

Asia

Region:
{Primal:y Sample Size)

sooth am
West Asia

Ew:ope,
Oceania
& canada

(24}

(36)

.0941

-.244

-.0664

-.164

.110

-.276

.0558

.227

-.106

.202

-.663

.0601

Teacher -Student
Ratio {log)

-.0002

-.0256

-.0599

.0633

.0234

~cher Relative
Wage (log)

-.0303

-.0058

.0385

-.155 '

-{16)

(21}

{62)

{e3}

Total Expemit ures
per Olild {log)

.135

-.0492

Male Enrollm ent
Ratio {log)

.151

Female Enrollnl ent
Ratio {log)

(Seconda ry sanple Size)

.155 .

(~ll

(35)

(18)

Total Expendi tures
per Child (lo;)

.155

-.177

.0258

-.0383

-.0596

Male Enrollm ent
Ratio (log)

.292

-.502

.170

--0742

.0671

Female Enrollm ent
Ratio {l.og)

.356

-.355

.235

- ..{)15

.0289

Teacher -Student
Ra.ti~ {leg)

-.129

.227

- ...lSB

Teacher ~tive

-.0123

.0753

. • Ol.D4

wage .(].cg)

·.0707
-0338

.0295
-.132

\
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The primary and secondary school regressions identify similar regional
patterns in residuals.

They suggest an unexplained underinvestment in primary

and secondary schooling in the South and West Asian region and in Latin
America.

Enrollment rates, in particular, are below the expected levels in

these regions.

The high level of teacher wages in Latin America and South: and

West Asia may be traced in part to the failure to enroll more children at the
secondary level in earlier years.

The higher current wage paid for teache~s

contributes to the higher price of educational services which deters these
regions from expending more resources on their school systems.
Deviations from the pattern predicted by the model based on income, price,
and demographic characteristics of the population may signal a disequilibrium
that might encourage the private sector to provide schooling.

There do not

appear to be sufficient data to test this conjecture, but private schools in
Latin America and portions of Asia and Africa are not increasing their share of
enrollments in response to the sluggish public sector provision of schooling
services (World Bank, 1986a).

Another hypothesis might be that stagnant

economic conditions have reduced the rewards for education in the work force,
and thereby depressed social and private rates of returns to education lowe.ring
investment in schooling.18/At least in the case of Latin America, studies do
not support the view that the underinvestment in secondary schooling is due to
a low return.

Indeed, the private returns that accrue to those in Latin

America who manage to get a secondary education are substantial (see below
Table 6).

If the overall framework proposed in this section is tenable, then

further study of country level educational outlays and achievements is
warranted, both to discover why expenditures on schooling deviate from the •
pattern estimated here and to determine if these deviations help to account for
the rate and structure of modern economic growth occurring in these countries.

Table 6
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-31Cross Sectional Findings and Time Series Forecasts

One method for evaluating the overall framework proposed above is to
calculate how well the educational changes in the last decade are explained by
the actual changes in the conditioning variables that occurred in this period,
weighted by the cross section estimates of the model.ill

For this purpose only

about half of the countries in the cross section sample report sufficient data
for the decade of 1965 to 1975 and time series forecasts are described only for
this subsample (T.P. Schultz, 1985).
The estimated model simulates the changes in expenditures and enrollments
reasonably well for the average of 65 observed primary school systems, that is,
93 and 94 percent of the growth is explained from 1965 to 1975 in expenditures
and enrollments, respectively.

Increases in incomes per adult of about a

quarter in this decade would have contributed by itself to an even larger
increase in expenditures than the one-third increase actually observed.

The

relative decline in primary school teacher salaries and urbanization moderated
slightly the prediced growth in expenditures.

Enrollment rates at the primary

level responded predominantly to the decline in relative prices (of teachers),
but also increased with incomes, particularly for females.
At the secondary school level the model underpredicts the increases of a
third in expenditures and a half in enrollments that actually occurred across
the sample of 48 countries.

Again, income growth alone would have suggested a

more rapid increase in expenditures than actually occurred, whereas the decline
in prices, urbanization and a small increase in cohort size restrained the
growth in secondary school expenditures per child.

Enrollments at the

secondary level respond strongly to the decline in relative price of teacher
salaries; these price effects are larger at the secondary level than they are
at the primary level.

Demographic characteristics of the sampled population
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did not change appreciably in this period and therefore had little effect on
predicted school resources or enrollments .
The main finding of this analysis of internationa l aggregate data from
educational systems is that public expenditures on schools have conformed to
anticipated patterns with respect to consumer.. incomes,· -relative fac-tor -prices,
and demographic constraints.

,At the secondary· level, and probably also. at the

primary level, rapid population growth has -depressed levels-of expenditure s per
child of school age. ·· This has occurred by increasing class size -and lowering
teacher salaries, but not by restricting notably enrollment.

In the future, as

the percentage of the population of school age declines markedly in Latin
America and East Asia, an increase in teacher-stud ent ratios may be expected,
whereas in Africa where the share of· school-aged ehildren will continue to
increase for some time, average classroom size may continue to increase.
Future research may help assess whether the decline in public school
expenditure s per student that is associated with rapid population growth is an
inefficient bureaucratic distortion in the allocation of social resources or an
efficient adjustment in factor proportions to local relative factor prices and
returns to the quantity and quality of school services.

Since Africa still

confronts relatively high prices for teachers, given the described dynamics of
expanding their school systems, the continued decline in teacher relative
prices should help this continent increase enrollments without necessarily
increasing outlays per student.

A critical policy question is how the public

sector can facilitate this efficient downward adjustment in the relative level
of teacher salaries.

Teachers·wi ll tend to·lobby in their own self interest to

postpone this adjustment and if they succeed it will
expansion in enrollments.

slow the continuing
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III. Alternative Models of Education and Earnings,
Data, and Policy Implications
A positive relationship between the schooling of workers and their earnings
is observed in household surveys and censuses in many countries (Psacharopoulos
1985; Blaug, 1976). -This empirical regularity-was first examined in-high .
income countries, such as the United States, and -then --described in ..many~ -other
countries.

-The conventional economic int:erpretation is to assume wages -·measure

labor's marginal product and that persons acquire education as they do
vocational training at a cost in terms of foregone opportunities that is repaid
by future streams of enhanced earnings.

The emphasis given to monetary returns

to education in the market labor force does not preclude the private and social
importance of nonmarket production returns to schooling or for that matter the
~ure consumption benefits of schooling.

The early focus on labor market

returns reflected the availability of data and the historic reliance of
economists on the marketplace to adjudicate issues of value as codified in
national income accounts.
The treatment of education as a form of capital investment embodied in the
human agent can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith, though it enters
into the mainstream of economic thinking in the 1950s and 1960s in the work of
T.W. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964).

The empirical relationship of wages and

schooling is conceptualized as a life cycle regularity or age-wage profile,
with the wage increasing first in the cross section with the age of the worker
and then decreasing beyond some age, when depreciation of productive skills
outweighs new investments in ·human capital.

Mincer (1962) proposed •human -

capital investments on-the-job after the-completion of schooling as an
explanation for the age-earnings profile.

By assuming that post-schooling

human capital investment declined regularly with the worker's accumulation of
labor market experience, and that human capital investment eventually ceased as
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retirement approached, Mincer (1974) was able to account for many interrelated
aspects of U.S. earnings for males, by schooling and by post-schooli ng
experience.
These basic empirical regularities are summarized in the earnings function.
This relationship has many interpretati ons, however, depending on what factors
generate the relationship (Rosen, 1977).

Assume that the real wage, w, of a

worker is a function of the individual's years of schooling, s, and other
productive characteris tics, z, such as ability:
(8)

w = f(s,z),

where z is assumed exogenously given to the individual, while hours of work,
school quality and non-school investments in productive marketable skills are
If the private cost of schooling to the student or family

initially ignored.

is approximated by the full-time opportunity cost of the student's time not
spent working in the labor market, then the present value (V) of the
individual's future earnings can be evaluated at the age of entering school:

V(s,z)

n

Js

w(s,z)

-rt

dt = w(s,z)(l/r)( e

-rs

-e

-rn

),

(9)

where n is the number of years after entering school when the individual
retires from the labor force and ceases to benefit from education.

If the

internal rate of return to additional schooling falls with increased schooling,
and the discount rate or financial constraint, r, does not vary across
schooling levels, then the family or individual continues to invest in
schooling until the present value of the individual's earnings is maximized.
The optimal level of schooling is that which equates the opportunity cost of
attending school (i.e. not working) to the discounted value of the lifetime
gain obtained from the increment to schooling, adjusted for the finiteness of
the working life:
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Ws = wr(l - e-r(n-s)),

(10)

where Ws is the partial derivative of the wage with respect to schooling.

If

retirement is viewed as infinitely distant, permitting one to neglect e-rn, an
e~pression for the logarithmic wage equation is obtained:
ln w - ln rV(s,z) + rs,

(11)

Interpersonal differences ins shift the wealth intercept and slope of the wage
with respect to the discount rate, while differences in z affect the intercept.
Thus, observations on ln wands do not generally identify the wage function
(8) or the optimal schooling attendance rule, s - D(r,z).

Observations on.

ability, z, and the financial constraint, r, may permit one to describe
empirically the wage and schooling functions.

If capital markets are perfect,

and r is the same for everyone, differences in z may allow one to estimate r
from a regression of the logarithm of the wage on years of schooling.

This

estimate does not describe how schooling affects the earnings of any particular
person, because z may still influence how much schooling is optimal for each
individual.

This interpretation of the wage equation (11) is consequently

called a reduced-form hedonic wage equation, embodying both a school attendance
equation conditional on rand z, and a wage function conditional on sand~
(Rosen, 1974, 1977).

This hedonic wage function does not presume to identify

how individuals vary their school enrollment in response to human capital
returns, or how the derived demand for labor depends on the educational
attainment of the worker.

This hedonic interpretation of the wage function,

however, admits more readily to the existence of market imperfections and
unanticipated developments contributing to substantial disequlibrium.rents in
the implicit valuation of different types of inelastically supplied skills
(Rosen, 1977; Lucas, 1977; Heckman and Sedlachek, 1985).
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differential effects of spells of market and nonmarket work experience on
women's market earnings in the United States.
experience variable

However, the post-schooling

originally proposed by Mincer has the attraction of being

fixed for the individual, once schooling has been determined and is, therefore,
not a choice variable or one that is likely to be particularly correlated with
unobserved market-oriented abilities or preferences.

Women's actual entry into

and exit from the labor force and even unemployment are endogenous choice
variables that must be jointly modeled with training investment, if the effect
of labor market histories on wages are to be suitably estimated.
Four broad overlapping problems with this human capital approach will be
taken up in the next section.

First, there are variables that may determine

wages, such as ability, but which are omitted from the above simplified
specification of the earnings function, and their omission may lead to biased
estimates of the partial association between schooling and wages that is the
basis for benefit-cost calculations or internal rate of return estimation.W
Moreover, some variables used as explanatory variables in the earnings function
are to some degree adult lifetime choice variables, such as labor supply or
tenure on current job, and treating these as exogenous conditioning variables
to explain the wage may also bias the estimated coefficient on schooling.
Finally, even education can be viewed as endogenous to the wage determination
process, when the focus of analysis is to estimate how parents trade off
various human capital investments in their children and other bequests
conditional on their children's exogenous endowments, such as sex and innate
ability.

But the simplifying convention in most studies of wage determinants

is to treat education as parentally determined and thus exogenous to the
child's lifetime choices as an adult that affect her or his life cycle
productive opportunities in both market and nonmarket activities.
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Second, the profile of post schooling on-the-job training investment cannot
generally be observed, and alternative proxies for Mincer's post-schooling
investment profile have been proposed.

An analogous tendency may exist for

employers to adopt a life-cycle incentive scheme that drives a wedge between
wages and labor's short run marginal product, with the goal of reducing
shirking by employees whose output is costly to monitor (Lazear, 1979).

In

either scheme the present value of the workers' profile of wages is equivalent
to the present value of their marginal productivity.
Third is the absence of suitable comparison groups.

It is never possible

to observe what particular persons would have earned, if they had obtained more
or less schooling than they did.

Comparisons are needed across schooling

groups to estimate benefits and they therefore depend on restrictive
assumptions, of which the most convenient is that parents choose the schooling
of their children, according to the parents' endowments and preferences, but
that these parent attributes do not affect their children's earnings, except to
the extent that they influence the children's schooling (see alternative
specifications estimated by Leibowitz, 1974). Holding constant in the wage
function for parent economic attributes (status) is then one strategy for
developing better schooling comparisons (Carnoy, 1967a; Bowles, 1972), but
other strategies exist and they can yield divergent conclusions (Griliches,
1977; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1977; Behrman and Wolfe, 1984a).

Another

approach is to specify explicitly the decision rule for schooling and then
correct for the implicit selection bias of schooling in the estimation of the
wage function (Willis and Rosen, 1979).

In this quasi structural equation

approach to self selection of education and the determination of earnings, the
researcher must still specify variables that influence the education decision,
but do not have a persisting effect on wages, conditional on schooling.

This
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and, therefore, has some of the arbitrariness associated with the earlier
approach that assigns the decision to prior parent attributes.

The empirical

importance of these alternative comparison methods are reviewed in Section IV.
Fourth is a discontinuity between the conceptual framework and
observations.

Theory pertains to individuals investing in their productive,:,'

capacity over a life cycle, but most data relate to different individuals of
•different ages, which are then combined to describe a "synthetic".life cycle
profile of earnings by age.

The different aged individuals in the cross

section have matriculated through different quality schools, lived through
different historical conditions, such as depressions and spells of
unemployment, and were born into different sized birth cohorts which may
influence their schooling and earnings opportunities (Freeman, 1979; Welch,
1979; Falaris and Peters, 1985; T.P. Schultz, 1985; Freeman and Bloom, 1985).
Moreover, the standard interpretation of the coefficient on schooling in the
wage function is that of a private rate of return in an equilibrium investment
setting (Mincer, 1974).

The applicability of the equilibrium investment theory

to a country where modern economic growth has only established itself recently,
and then occurred sporadically over time, may be misleading.

Older cohorts

were probably educated without the expectation of their current realized
returns.

The effects of economic growth on life-cycle returns to schooling in

low-income countries have rarely been analyzed with appropriate longitudinal
data, an exception being that of Malaysia by Smith (1983).

Lacking the

required panel or retrospective data in most countries, short- and medium-run
fluctuations in the aggregate economy can perturb the apparent levels of
educational returns as estimated from "synthetic" age cross sections,
particularly at younger ages.W
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All of the above problems in the human capital interpretation of the
relationship between schooling and earnings could be viewed as "revisionist" in
spirit.

This is because they attempt to revise and reformulate the human

capital concepts, to modify its empirical specification, to use better
estimating techniques for the wage equation, and to collect more appropriate
data to bring the evidence closer to the core of the theory.

Other critiques

of the human capital interpretation of the education-wage regularity seek to
find a fundamentally different way to explain how education influences labor
market outcomes.
The primary alternative hypothesis is that of signaling or screening
(Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973).

According to this view, education does not act to

train or to socialize a worker to perform more productive tasks individually or
in a team.

Rather, education filters or screens on the native ability or

productivity of the worker, without enhancing it.

Information on ability is

signaled to the employer by the worker investing his time and resources in the
acquisition of schooling.

A private gain from schooling may still be inferred

from the schooling-wage relationship, but the social return to schooling is
more complex.

The production of information needed to assign more able workers

to jobs where these abilities are more productive yields a social product, but
what is not clear is whether education is an efficient mechanism to accomplish
this matching of workers and jobs?

To many observers, education would seem to

be a time consuming and costly device to screen for the ability of workers, if
schools do not also augment their skills. If it could be shown that an
alternative screen worked as well as education, but had lower social costs,
then the alternative scheme would be socially preferable to education.
The simple fact that no society, capitalist or socialist, has pursued an
alternative scheme to education to produce the information needed to match
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workers to jobs casts doubt on the validity of this extreme form of the
signaling hypothesis.

But a more moderate interpretation would hypothesize
.
that school credentials provide an important source of information in the ~bor

market that employers can access at low cost.

Educational attainment is a

means to "discriminate statistically" among workers in hiring; it is moreover a
means that is accepted by some as fair (Blaug, 1985), whereas many other
groupings of individuals that might be used to discriminate statistically are
challenged by some as socially unfair, such as by race, sex, age, marital
status, and ethnic group.
Within an undistorted general equilibrium framework, both the human capital
and the screening hypotheses provide alternative explanations for the
schooling-wage relationship.

It remains to be demonstrated whether the

screening theory "can be made to yield interesting and testable implications .in
the absence of direct measurement of ability" (Arrow, 1973:215).

Empirical

tests of the importance of the screening hypothesis have followed several
directions.

The first identifies situations where labor market institutions

appear more or less likely to depend on the screening information of schooling
in determining labor's payment.

Private returns to schooling according to the

screening hypothesis should be greater in those situations where the hiring
mechanism could readily rely on schooling as a screen.

Many studies have

contrasted the private returns to schooling in wage employment and in self
employment.

Self employed, and in particular small farmers, are a class of

workers producing within a reasonably well understood technology, where outputs
and inputs are competitively sold and bought, respectively.

Higher earning~

associated with a farmer's schooling, net of inputs, cannot be readily
explained by screening but can by human capital.

Analogous reasoning suggests

that public sector employment might be most prone to emphasize educational
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credentials as a screen, but this does not emerge clearly from empirical
studies (Psacharopoulos, 1985; Van der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1986b).
Educational differentials in wages might be exaggerated at the time of hiring
by screening, but should diminish with job tenure as the employer learns more
about the worker's productivity.
Psacharopoulos, 1974).

But they do not appear to (Layard and

Since none of these testable implications of the

screening hypothesis receive strong support from data in high or low income
countries, are we to conclude that screening by education does not occur?

Self

selection of occupation could explain the first results, if the ablest educated
workers choose to be self employed and the ablest uneducated seek to be wage
earners, widening the observed education-wage differentials for self employed
compared with wage earners.

Analogously, job tenure is not exogenous, and

employers may selectively fire the educated worker who does not produce at the
anticipated level, leading to the persistence in wage differentials by
educational level with increasing job tenure.

Self employment may be more

risky than wage employment and a risk premium to the self employed complicates
comparisons of earnings across these types of jobs.

The more educated worker

may be less prone to quit or turn over at his or her initiative, ~nd this
tendency may explain part of the wage premium received by the more educated
(Weiss, 1984; Kiefer, 1985; Donohue, 1986). The intrinsic difficulty in
discriminating between the human capital and screening interpretation leaves in
doubt whether for most practical purposes it matters which mixture of these
stories best describe reality.
A third approach views education as an instrument for job competition in a
distorted labor market (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1977).

If wages are not

flexible downward and an excess supply of educated labor exists for the
available jobs requiring a specified level of education, the employer is
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for the job until the supply of educationally qualified job applicants no
-longer exceeds the respective demand for labor.

This "job ladder" model is

similar to the Harris-Todaro (1970) model where urban-unemployment, a form of
queuing, clears the labor market that is also distorted by an excessive and
rigid wage in urban employment.

The rationing of jobs by education, if wages

are sticky downward, provides a second-best economic outcome in the ·presence of
labor market distortions, and leads to the employment of over qualified
workers.

An inefficient match of workers and jobs occurs in this formulation.

A similar "bumping" model is proposed by Fields (1974a) in a partial
equilibrium context.

I have not found empirical tests of this third approach

to modeling the effects of education in a distorted labor market.
Measurements of distortions in labor markets are rarely conclusive, even
though many influential theories of economic development are built on specific
sectoral distortions and distinctions in the labor market.

The intrinsic

problem with estimating the magnitude of distortions is the expectation that
variation in unobserved productive characteristics of workers provides an
alternative explanation for wage differences between workers in distorted and
undistorted sectors.

For example, the empirical tendency for union wages to

exceed nonunion wages, given the worker's observed skills, suggests an economic
distortion may be created by unions (Lewis, 1963, 1985).

But if unionized

sectors attract more productive workers or the union as an institution raises
the productivity of its membership, no loss in efficiency may result (Freeman
and Medoff, 1984).

A challenge to labor economics is to document situations

where there appear to be wage differences between otherwise similarly endowed
and situated groups of workers.

If explanations for these regularities, or

group wage differences, cannot be confirmed, the empirical weight of the
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evidence may grow and a consensus for policy might follow, as in the case of
the effect of minimum wage policies on employment opportunities for the least
experienced and skilled workers in high income countries (Welch, 1978).

One

conclusion of this survey is that studies that ignore the human capital
heterogeneity of labor in low income countries may be seriously misleading.
The large wage differentials observed by worker education (as well as by sex
and often region) realistically preclude interpretation of aggregate sectoral
wage variation as compelling evidence of distortions, particularly in low
income countries.

Refining the evidence of labor market distortions within and

across low income countries at the disaggregate level of workers and firms is
an important research frontier in development economics.

The theories of wage

variation that were recapitulated in this section may provide a basis for these
microeconomic studies of wage structures.

The next section reviews in more

detail the empirical problems of inferring the returns to education from
microeconometri c studies.

IV.

Rates of Return to Schooling in Market Activities

Estimates of the rates of return to education can be calculated on two
bases.

The private rate of return is the internal rate of return that

equalizes the present discounted private opportunity and direct cost of
schooling with the discounted value of the private after-tax gains.

The social

rate of return adds to private costs the public and private subsidies that the
individual stuqent and family do not bear, and augments the private gains to
include taxes and any net positive social externalities that are not captured
by the private individual and family.

In reality, it is rare for studies to

assign monetary values to social externalities of education, or to private
nonmarket benefits of schooling.

Relatively few private return calculations
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even deduct for the marginal income taxes paid the state by the more educated
worker.

This latter task is not conceptually difficult, but would not make any

difference if taxes were proportional to wages.

Consequently, the distinction

between private and social returns is in practice the inclusion of the social
cost of public expenditures per pupil in addition to private family costs of
schooling.

Social returns are, therefore, lower than private returns to the

extent that the educational system is publicly subsidized.
Private returns provide one incentive for individuals and families to
invest in education, while the consumption value of schooling provides the
second (unobserved) motivation for private decisions regarding education.

For

social resources to be efficiently allocated, they should be invested in each
level and type of education to the point where the marginal social returns are
driven down to levels that social and private investments receive in other
sectors of the economy.
Private individuals are attracted to higher private return activities, but
the efficiency rationale for public subsidies in education is no different than
elsewhere, as Becker observed many years ago (1964).

Neglecting distributional

issues, public subsidies for education should vary in proportion to the
positive social externalities generated by the specific type and level of
education.

It is commonly believed that externalities from education are more

substantial at the basic primary level, and eventually peter out at the higher
technical specialized levels of university training, where persons capture most
of the social benefits (minus taxes) from their education (Weisbrod, 1964).
Research activities that are often combined with higher education may, however,
be responsible for substantial social externalities, to the -extent that their
services are nonappropriable by the research university and hence freely
available to firms and households.
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There are, however, issues surrounding the empirical measurement of the
returns to schooling outlined in section III, that need to be discussed
further.

The first class of problems involve estimation bias introduced by

inadequate specification of student ability, parent background, and school
quality.

Ideally, these could be corrected by agreement on specification and

availability of better data.

Short of that ultimate goal, most studies must

build on imperfect specifications and data.

My own judgments are offered below

as to what are the more serious problems and the direction of bias to be
anticipated.

The second class of problems arise because only a portion of the

population reports the information sought on wages and related productive
characteristics.

If

selection into the sample is related to the

schooling-wage relationship, a bias may be expected.

Selection problems are

likely to be more important when the criteria for inclusion in the sample
involves the choice of occupation, labor force participation, or migration, all
of which can be plausibly linked to the educational qualifications of the
worker.

In these cases, the sample selection problem is essentially one of

estimating by simultaneous equations methods some form of labor market behavior
and the wage equation.

There is no consensus, however, on how to choose the

identifying restrictions needed to estimate thus the returns to education while
correcting for this source of sample selection.
Student Ability, Parent Background, and School Quality

The foremost source of bias embodied in estimated education-wage
relationships occurs because of the role of student ability and parental status
in a more completely specified model of the wage determination process.

As

illustrated earlier, it is likely that more able students obtain more
schooling, and wage payments for native ability are then being incorrectly
attributed to schooling.

Even when ability is observed before schooling

-48-

occurs, a rich variety of alternative methods have been proposed to disentangle
education's independent effect on wages.

This large literature cannot be

adequately summarized here (e.g. Griliches and Mason, 1972; Hause, 1972; Welch,
1975; Taubman, 1976; Behrman et al., 1980; Willis, 1987).

If ability is simply

omitted from the wage function, estimates of the rate of return to schooling
may be upward biased, but in most cases by no more than 5 to 15 percent.
Indeed, when ability and schooling are symmetrically treated as variables which
are measured with error and potentially affected by common unobservables,
Griliches (1977) illustrates with U.S. panel data how the "true" effect of
schooling is actually underestimated by omitting ability and covariant
unobservables from the analysis.

Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985) examine

data from Tanzania and Kenya to assess how cognitive achievement is influenced
by schooling and native ability, and how all three factors affect later
earnings in the labor force. Not only c a n ~ ~ ability be held constant, it
is also possible to evaluate whether education's effect on wages operates
through test scores or by other means such as credentialism or screening.
conclude from their data that

They

"literate and numerate workers are more

productive, and education is valuable to workers because it can give them
skills that increase their productivity" (p. 1029).

Their analysis of

contemporary East Africa "provides strong support for the human capital
interpretation of the educational structure of wages" (p. 1029).
Another important and often omitted variable is parent background or social
status.

If wealthy and powerful parents secure for their offspring both

education and a well-paying job, the correlation between their children's
education and wages may overstate the "true" effect of education on wages or
labor productivity.

Carnoy (1967a) examines this hypothesis with

intergeneration al data from Mexico and others have replicated this approach
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as on the worker's education, age, etc.

Most studies have found, as did

Carnoy, that father's occupation is strongly related to the child's wages, but
contrary to expectations, that much of this "effect" of parent background is
intermediated through the child's educational attainment.

Thus, "increasing

the average skill level of the father has only a small effect on the son's
incomes" given the son's schooling (Carnoy, 1967a; p. 418).

In other words,

the substantial private rates of return to education that Carnoy found in
Mexico "show little sensitivity to changes in average-occupational level" of
the father.

Heckman and Hotz (1986) found a greater sensitivity of schooling

returns to their inclusion of both mother's and father's education in a recent
analysis of a 1983 survey from Panama.

Their results suggest that the role of

the mother's education may exceed that of the father's, just as Leibowitz
(1974) found in a U.S. sample from the 1950s.

The estimated average private

rate of return to schooling in Panama was reduced from 13.0 to 8.6 percent with
the inclusion of both parent's education variables (Heckman and Hotz, 1986).
Various interpretations are given to the explanatory role of parent
education or background in the child's wage function.

The one proposed at the

outset is nepotism and social stratification that allow influential parents to
place their child in a favorable job, frustrating efficient market mechanisms,
(Bowles, 1972).

Alternatively, more educated parents may provide the child

with a more favorable learning environment at home, thereby lowering the cosF
of learning or increasing the market productivity of attending school for aj
given number of years (Leibowitz, 1974; Murnane, et al. 1981).

The genetic ,

transmission of ability from parent, proxied by education, to child is another
possible mechanism behind this relationship.

Parents may also vary their

market investment in their children, given the number of years that their

~sochildren attend school, through the "quality" or resource intensity of the
schooling they provide their children.

Adopting this final interpretation of

the source of the parent background effects on the child's future wages, social
scientists have proceeded to specify and measure how home learning environments
differ, and how the level and mix of resources internally allocated by the
school system to the pupil's education varies, and, finally, what are the
effects of these different mixes of investment inputs on the child's subsequent
earnings in the labor force.
Originally the addition of parent education or other indicators of parent
socioeconomic status to the earnings function of a child was designed to purge
the returns to education of the effects of parent wealth and influences that
were not operating through the child's education.

But Griliches (1977) and

others have shown that inclusion of parent education or background can also
over-correct for this possibility and bias downward the educational returns or
merely increase the erratic performance of the earnings function.

To the

extent that more educated parents tend to invest more in the education of their
children, it is not clear why this component of education should not be
examined to infer returns to schooling,

To understand how educational

decisions are made intergeneration ally should provide a structural foundation
for explaining who gets educated, as well as eventually estimating how the
observed returns to education are affected by who receives the education
(Willis and Rosen, 1979).

It may then be possible to estimate additionally how

parent education also influences their children's earnings by providing them
with home investments, social connections, and physical wealth.
Unfortunately, relatively few bodies of data measure the home and school
environment in such detail and also follow over time the child's subsequent
wage profile in the labor market.

Nonetheless, imperfect data have been used
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quantity of schooling, culminating in the estimation of education production
functions (Kiesling, 1971; Averch, 1974 et al.; Hanushek, 1979, 1986).

Welch

(1966) first analyzed public expenditures per pupil, length of school year,
teacher salaries, and classroom size, among other variables, to account for
market wage returns to expenditure s on schooling across U.S. states (assuming
people did not move).

Where parallel school systems serve distinct segments of

the population, the consequence s for wage differences between these populations
can be decomposed into those attributable to different years of schooling and
to the different resource intensities of their segregated school systems
(Welch, 1975; Orazem, 1983).
Others have employed micro data on the earnings of individual workers,
their schooling, and the characteris tics of the schools they attended (e.g.
Johnson and Stafford, 1973; Link and Ratledge, 1975; Rizzuto and Wachtel,
1980).

The analogous analytical process has been pursued in low income

countries with proxies devised to measure the "quality" of schools and teachers
(Birdsall, 1985).

These studies address the policy choice of extending more

schooling to more people by pushing out the extensive margin, or investing
those resources in more intensive schooling activities, such as improving the
training and salaries of teachers.

Clearly, a tradeoff of efficiency and

equality of opportunity may have to be faced when in practice public funds may
either be used to expand the quantity or quality of schooling (Behrman and
Birdsall, 1983).

Even if it could be assumed that the benefits flow in either

case to the same person, and thus there were no distribution al effects, it is
difficult to infer whether the future market productivity of a worker who is
offered more years of existing quality schooling will be larger or smaller than
if those same educational resources had been used to provide the worker with
better quality schooling.
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One empirical conclusion should be expected: when "qualitative" measures of
schooling are added to the earnings function, the estimated private returns to
"years of schooling" will undoubtedly decrease.

This follows from the general

underlying positive covariance between quantity and quality of schooling.
Regions spending more on schooling will attract more students to enroll and
stay in school longer, because for the same private opportunity cost of the
student's time, a more concentrated and presumably more valuable investment is
accumulated.

It is also a common empirical regularity to observe a positive

regional association between parent private home investments (that are
generally unobserved in data used to study wages) and public school quality
investments.

Thus, unless the home environment is held constant, variables

that measure school quality will also proxy these reinforcing background
private investments and
quality and quantity.

bias upward estimates of the wage returns to school

Regardless, the simple estimate of returns to school

quantity should always be interpreted as capturing the effect of increased
quantity plus the uncontrolled background association in the sample between
school quality and levels of schooling.
While we cannot confidently generalize about the relative returns of school
quality and quantity on market wages, international comparative studies of
education's effects on standardized school achievement tests do suggest several
regularities that might guide future research to measure how the economic
returns to schooling differ across these extensive and intensive margins.
Generally, "the potency of a pupil's home background or social status is
significantly less (important) than it is in the industrialized countries in
determining pupil achievements" (Heyneman, 1984: p. 299).

Conversely, "the

variation in academic achievement attributable to factors internal to school
classrooms, such as the quality of the teacher and physical facilities" is
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significantly more important in explaining test performance in low income
countries than in the more developed countries (Heyneman, 1984: 299).

Although

the reason for these differences in the roles of family background and school
quality in determining pupil achievement is not well established, some have
concluded

that the leverage of public policy on pupil performance through

improvements in school quality is greater in low income countries than it is in
high income countries (Heyneman and Loxley, 1983).

Unfortunately, the

relationship between test achievement scores and subsequent wage rates is not
always strong, raising the question whether test achievement is a satisfactory
indicator of schooling output, particularly across countries where the derived
demands for educated skills differ greatly.

Indeed, it has been a frustrating

finding of many of the more thorough studies of educational production
functions in the United States and in other countries that well-accepted
dimensions of school quality, such as teacher-student ratios, exhibit little
systematic relationship to student performance (Averch, 1974; Simmons and
Alexander, 1978; Hanushek, 1979, 1986). More research is required to generalize
about how changes in the mix of school inputs and management incentives affect
school outputs.

Moreover, economic evaluation studies of schools must go

beyond assessing the impact of schools on student test achievements and follow
up the differential economic success of students in the labor market by
measuring their subsequent earnings.

As with estimates of the returns to years

of schooling, estimates of the benefits from using a more efficient mix of
inputs in the school may be biased if the sample variation in input mix is not
randomized, and thus potentially correlated with unmeasured variables
determining earnings or who is educated, either at the level of the individual
or school.
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reduce the demand for leisure and induce him or her to work longer hours
(Lindsay, 1971).

The negative sign of the physical wealth effect on labor
~'

supply is based on the standard assumption that the demand for leisure and,time
in nonmarket production is a positive function of wealth.

But according to

Mincer's (1974) equilibrium investment framework, the present value of the~
of human and physical capital is not affected by investments in schooling.': In
this case, the total wealth effect of schooling should be unimportant.
The voluntary labor supply response to the increased wage rate offered to
more educated workers can be decomposed in the Slutsky equation into an i~come
effect and an income-compensated price (wage) effect.

Again the Mincerian

framework would lead us to expect relatively small income effects associated
with schooling, if individuals face a common financial constraint and can
borrow at the same interest rate.

This assumption may be less realistic in

countries with less developed loan markets for investment in human capital and
greater inequality in family wealth.

In these countries one should expect.:to

observe a greater tendency for the more educated to work fewer hours.

Thi\;:

tendency would lead to underestimating the private return to schooling based on
annual earnings, because the more educated receive part of their return from
schooling in the form of increased time for nonmarket activities, including
leisure.

Conversely, this argument would lead one to expect a greater tendency

for the more educated to work longer hours in societies where family wealth is
more equally distributed and loan instruments for investments in human capital
are widely available.

The income compensated price (wage) effect would

encourage the more educated to work longer hours.

If this were the only effect

of education on labor supply, annual earnings comparisons would overstate the
private returns to schooling.
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For youth and married women, the partial association of education and hours
of market work tends to be positive, if other sources of income, such as family
or husband income, are held constant.

If hours in the labor market increase

with education, then the change in "annual earnings" associated with schooling
probably overstates private returns, because the offsetting loss of nonmarket
production and leisure is not deducted from the gains in market earnings.
Change in "wage rates" (e.g. annual earnings divided by hours) attributable to
education is thus a more suitable approximation of the welfare benefits from
schooling than changes in weekly, monthly, or annual earnings, particularly for
women.23/ The preferred dependent variable in the earnings function is, thus,
the logarithm of the hourly wage rate, deflated of course by local prices.

To

introduce measures of labor supply among the right-hand-side explanatory
variables in the wage function is also inappropriate, unless they are treated
as endogenous.ill
Unemployment can represent a productive period of search for an appropriate
match of workers' skills and job opportunities.

If unemployment is greater

among more educated youth during a relatively short period after they complete
their schooling, the opportunity cost of this search should be reckoned along
with the other costs of schooling to be paid back by enhanced earnings in later
employments (Blaug, 1973; Turnham, 1971; Berry, 1975; Gregory, 1980; Berry and
Sabot, 1984).

A decade or longer after entry into the labor market,

unemployment is generally lower among the more educated (Ashenfelter and Harn,
1979; Nickell, 1979).

If this pattern does not reflect a current choice of the

worker between nonmarket activities and
called "involuntary."

market work, then unemployment may be

One of the private gains from increased schooling is

presumably the enhanced access to regular work opportunities in the market
labor force, and hence a lower incidence of such involuntary unemployment.
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While individuals may reduce their own unemployment by investing in schoolfng,
it has not been empirically shown that a more educated labor force experiences
in the aggregate less unemployment. Private returns to education may, thus,
exceed social returns from this source.W

In many studies that construct

estimates of the returns to education, the unemployed appear to be excluded and
variation in labor supply is neglected.

One explanation for the omission of

the unemployed from the working samples from which rates of return to education
are estimated by regression methods is simply the lack of an appropriate wage
for the currently unemployed.

Unemployment is probably also more difficult to

measure reliably in low income than in high income countries, because of the
greater ambiguity in classifying activity as nonmarket or market.

Nonetheless,

returns to schooling should be estimated for all persons, to avoid potential
sources of selectivity bias.

Simultaneous analysis should, therefore, evaluate

how education affects market labor supply behavior, unemployment, and the wage
rate of those employed.
Occupational Choice

Returns to education are, for a variety of reasons, sometimes calculated
within subpopulations.

If these subpopulations are defined by exogenous

characteristics, such as race, caste or sex, interpretation is relatively
straightforward, though differential participation in the labor force may
remain a source of bias in intergroup comparisons.

q,

But when the subpopulations

are not closed, as in the case of regions, because interregional migration is
substantial, or in the case of occupations, because education may be an
important qualification for entry into an occupation, a complex problem of
selection bias may be present, and its empirical valuation may be difficult.
In an extreme instance, Eckaus (1973b) calculated for the United States r~turns
to education within a large number of narrow occupations, and drew the

-58-

conclusion that educational returns (within occupations) were lower than other
studies would have led us to expect.

With hindsight, it is obvious that what

Eckaus had shown was that much of the returns to education accrue through the
changes in occupation that education facilitates.

University education might

not increase substantially the productivity of a plumber, for example, and
consequently persons with university degrees who remained plumbers would be a
highly unrepresentative sample of university graduates.

Both the technology of

plumbing and the self selection of persons into that occupation could
contribute to the observed unrepresentative returns within this single
occupation.
The same criticism is relevant to the careful studies by Wolpin (1977) and
Riley (1979), that sought to determine whether the wage-education relationship
would differ across subsamples of occupations, for which the informational
screening role of schooling might be more or less important.

Their evidence in

support or against the screening hypothesis is ambiguous, therefore, because of
the possible self-selection of different types of persons into different
occupations.

The problem is posed and solved under specific assumptions by Hay

(1984), where he models the decision of U.S. physicians of their
specialization, for example surgery, and the later earnings they receive within
such a medical specialty.

A selection correction term (see Heckman, 1979) is

introduced for all of the occupational choices in all of the
occupation-specific earnings equations. Hay's method then permits one to
estimate the returns to each specialized educational path for a representative
individual, rather than the biased-by-selection returns for those who actually
opted for each specialization.

Vijverberg (1986) has also developed a method

for analyzing jointly the occupational choice and wage equation, conditional on
being a wage earner.

Much further empirical study of occupational choice and
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education are distinct in different occupations, or that these differences in
returns are those prescribed by any form of the screening hypothesis.
It is still tempting to decompose the effects of such exogenous traits as
education, race or gender on earnings, and appraise what portion of the -effe~t
occurs because of occupational sorting and what portion occurs within
occupations (Polachek, 1979).

Since the stochastic processes determining

occupation and earnings are undoubtedly affected jointly by unobserved factors,
this form of decomposition of a simultaneous equation system is feasible only
when identifying restrictions are known~ priori, that is, a factor is known
that influences occupation but not earnings, which can therefore be used to
explain occupational sorting but can be justifiably omitted from the structural
earnings equation.

Studies nonetheless assume, without a clear justification,

that occupational choice and earnings are block recursive and hence
stochastically independent (Birdsall and Sabot, forthcoming).

How well these

single-equation estimation methods approximate reality is not yet known.
Possibly the most important occupational distinction is between wage and
salary earners, on the one hand, and self-employed workers, on th~ other hand.
Most research on the returns to schooling focuses on the former class of
employees, because labor earnings are more directly observed for them, without
first deducting inputs from gross income.W

When wage earners are a large

fraction of the labor force, as in high income countries, omitting the self
employed has become a standard, if indefensible, practice in empirical studies.
When employees are a small but growing fraction of the labor force, there is
reason to suspect that the synthetic age-wage profile across education groups
of employees may not be a satisfactory basis for ~stimating lifetime returns to
schooling in the overall economy.W

Yet there are relatively few studies that
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analyze how selection into the employee subsample could bias estimated returns
to education (e.g.

Anderson, 1982; Griffin, 1985).

If one ignores the probable covariance between the choice of whether to be
a wage earner or a self employed worker and the worker's potential earnings, it
is possible to estimate without selection'<:o rr-ection.the -wage functions for
self employed and wage earners separately, and simply compare the coefficients
on the worker's years of schooling within.the two strata.

The proportiona te

upward shifts in wage rates or earnings with schooling are of a similar
magnitude within these strata in Thailand (C. Chiswick, 1979), Colombia (Fields
and Schultz, 1982), and Israel (Ben-Porath, 1986).

The greater role of

transitory income variation in the earnings of self employed has been
frequently emphasized in the economics literature, but its relevance to the
returns realized from education is unclear.
salient weaknesses with such comparisons.

There are, nonetheless , two
First, they assume that the self

employed are able and willing to report their labor earnings, net of the value
of purchased and owned inputs (e.g. rental value of owned land and business
capital).

In fact we know from developed countries such as the US that farmers

and unincorpora ted business persons report incomes to surveys and tax
authorities that are much less than the income imputed to them by trustworthy
national accounts.

How this understatem ent of self-employe d income would bias

comparisons by education is unclear.

To reduce this potential source of

reporting bias, Teilhet and Waldorf (1983) followed a small sample of
self-employe d in the informal sector of Bangkok to derive estimates of their
net return to labor.

The returns to schooling appeared to be no less for these

self employed than for wage earners, though obtaining more education
predisposed men in their sample to obtain a job for wages.
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increase across age groups in the cross section.

It would appear then that· the

life cycle process of accumulating skills, experience, contacts, and physic.al
·capital increases the likelihood that the individual .chooses to become sel~'_:
employed (Fields and Schultz, 1982; Ben-Porath, 1986) .. In .approaching
retirement, self employment may also afford a worker more opportunity than does
t.

wage employment to adjust labor supply downward and is thus more attractiveYlas
a means to smooth the labor supply path at older ages (Fuchs, 1980).

However,
:
the tendency for the share of self employed workers in the labor force to

decline with development has been long noted (Kuznets, 1966) and it could also
explain the below average fraction of young workers in self employment and the
rising fraction before retirement.

There is little empirical evidence to

disentangle the life cycle and the development process as they both influence
.
0
who chooses wage versus self employment and how this choice interacts with·
returns on education.

The null hypothesis remains to be rejected, namely that

education increases the productive possibilities of workers in both wage and
self employments.
A study by Behrman and Wolfe (1984b) of Nicaragua in 1977 presents
:-:

estimates of earnings functions for men and women corrected for two aspectskof
sample selection: participation in the labor market, and reporting of labor'
earnings.

This second restriction of the sample may exclude many self-employed

workers, whose gross income includes undetermined amounts of returns to capital
and land and unpaid family workers.

How to treat missing variables in

'.}
-~~~

microeconometrics is a largely unresolved problem;- to treat missing date as-' a
potential source of selection bias is appealing in its generality.

However,

this corrective strategy can be effective only to the extent that the strue'ture
of the selection decision rule is well understood.

Observed variables must·be
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directl y
singled out that reasona bly enter that decisio n rule but do not belong
in the earning s equatio n.

In the Behrman and Wolfe study of Nicarag ua, the

ve of
self-em ployed may find it particu larly hard to reckon net earning s exclusi
the value of interme diate inputs and the rental value of land and owned
produc tive assets.

In their sample·, ·,·only-6 8 percent- -of- Nicarag uan .mal-e members

labor
of the rural labor force report earning s, while 91 percen t-of the male
s may
force in the capita l-city of Managua report earning s .. Reporti ng earning
ent. The
thus be a proxy for the individ ual's occupa tion or sector of employm
s are
variab les that Behrman and Wolfe specify to identif y who reports earning
female
the partici pant's "other income" and "own-fa rm other income" and the
ated,
respon dent's "partic ipation in the formal or informa l sector. " As anticip
their
farmers and partici pants in the informa l self-em ployed sector report
larly
earning s less often than do those working in the formal sector, particu
tional
those in Managu a. Selecti on correct ion procedu res that introdu ce occupa
discuss ed
effects into the earning s functio n may introdu ce their own bias, as
on
above, and these might be more serious than ignorin g the origina l selecti
problem associa ted with non respons e.

This would seem a danger when the

ous and
variabl es identif ying the selecti on correct ion are themsel ves endogen
(i.e.
correla ted with the earning s outcome , as would appear to be true here
owned land or informa l sector attachm ent).

But the perenn ial problem of

be studied
missing data and nonresp onse bias is importa nt and must continu e to
to live
from many perspec tives in the hopes that eventu ally we will learn how
with this limitat ion of microec onomic househo ld survey data.
Anderso n (1982) correct ed for the selecti on bias in her sample of
wage and
Guatem alan husband s, where only about half of her sample reporte d a
the others were mainly self-em ployed.

The slope of her estimat ed market wage

schooli ng
offer curve (identi fied by the exclusi on of wealth) with respect to
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(identified by the exclusion of experience) with respect to schooling, .094
versus .074, based on Heckman's (1979) assumption that the errors were normally
distributed (Anderson, 1982; Table 3).

Her selection correction was

statistically significant but ·her data do not,appear -consistent ·with ·the
normality assumption.

In this case, husband'-s weeks ·Qf participation .as a wage

laborer are positively related to his education, and negatively to his wealth.
The Education and Productivity of Farmers
Many studies have specifically analyzed the education of farmers as a
factor in agricultural productivity.

Griliches (1964) in the U.S., and Hayami

and Ruttan (1970) across countries, found that the education of farmers was an
important determinant of agricultural productivity.

Sixteen studies of the

relationship between farmer education and productivity in low income countries
were recently surveyed by Lockheed et al. (1980) and extended in Jamison and
Lau (1982).

These studies analyzed 37 sets of farm level data that allowed

estimation of the effect of farmer education on profits or output, controlling
for other variables.

Averaging the varied effects of education obtained in

these studies, the productivity of farmers was on average 8.7 percent higher if
they had completed four years of primary schooling (a threshold level) compared
with none.

More refined calculations are also developed by Jamison and Lau

(1982) for three countries where they could further analyze the primary data.
From their samples from Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea they estimate a
year of schooling is on average associated with a net increment to farm product
of 5.1, 2.8 and 2.3 percent.

Social returns to rural schooling are then

calculated for the 1970s under various working assumptions; the social returns
are between 25-40 percent, 14-25 percent and 7-11 percent in Malaysia, Thailand
and South Korea, respectively.
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the case of farmers, where researchers can build on a long tradition of
econometric production and management studies.

The organizing hypothesis first

advanced by Welch (1970) was that education could have three distinct effects
on production.

First, education might-enhance the productivity of measured

inputs including that of an hour of labor.

Second, education might lower·the

cost of deciphering information about the production technology that thereby
increases productive efficiency by changing the selected mix of outputs and
inputs.

This is a static allocative efficiency effect.

Third, education might

facilitate more rapid entrepreneurial responses to disequilibria created by
changes in output and input prices, and by the introduction of new inputs and
production technologies.

Huffman (1974, 1976, 1977), Fane (1975), Khaldi

(1975), Wu (1977) and Pudassini (1983) proceeded to decompose the productivity
gains of more educated farmers into efficiency and allocative gains.

Huffman

(1974) illustrates how the decline in fertilizer prices led more educated
farmers to use more fertilizer and thereby increase their net farm income.
Aggregate and individual data are also used to document how more educated
farmers are more likely to adopt new productive innovations and accelerate the
diffusion of such innovations (Rosenzweig, 1982b; Jamison and Lau, 1982).
A final dimension of the adaptive response of the more educated farmer is
his supply of family labor off-farm.

In other words, the occupational mobility

that education facilitates is also linked to dual employments, on-farm and
off-farm.

In the U.S. and in low income countries, a growing share of the

income of farm families is from non-farm activities (Huffman, 1980; Rosenzweig
1980) and education increases these income flows as well as adding to
agricultural production.

When returns to education are larger elsewhere in the

economy (Gisser, 1965; Moock, 1976), the more educated farmer and his family
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the more educated managers who are the first to reenter agriculture, at least
in the US (Tolley, 1970).

The measurement of returns to education from

migration can, thus, as with occupational choice, not be readily separated from
the returns to education within a particular segment.of an.open economy.
::-,:-

Migration

°·

It is generally observed that the better educated are more likely to
migrate, unconditionally and when conditioned on other motivating·factors
(Schwartz, 1976; Greenwood, 1975; T.P. Schultz, 1982b).

Several of the working

assumptions that permit one to interpret the proportionate shift in the
earnings function associated with a year of schooling as a private rate of
return may be in error when migration occurs.

Real wages are generally higher

in urban than in rural areas of low income countries, Wand net migration
therefore tends to occur from the rural to the urban sector. Individuals who
incur their opportunity costs of education (foregone earnings as a student) in
the low wage rural sector and then enter the high wage urban labor force stand
to gain from education, from migration, and from a combined effect of arbitrage
in the investment process.

Given the tendency for more educated men
and wo~n
.
.:1•

to migrate in their youth shortly after finishing school, it can be misleading
to estimate a return to schooling within the rural sector that excludes the
gains from the increased probability of outmigration from the rural sector.
Conversely, estimating a wage function for only the urban labor market may also
be misleading, because it does not recognize that rural in-migrants realize
larger returns than estimated given because their costs of attending school in
rural areas were lower.
The problem is illustrated empirically in Table 7 with data from the 1973
Census of Colombia.

Estimates of monthly earnings functions in the upper panel

•

Table 7
Mmt:hly Inccme Bpltirm for Rural aid UJ:ban lb:mts
by run:ent Residence

am

Birthplace:

O:,latbia 1973

. (beneat.'l reqressim coefficientc:; in paren~ am the absolute ·values of the t ratios)

Schooling
in Years

Post School
Experience
in Ye:-rrs

Sqt1a!"E!d
(10-2)

(447.)
5.320
(294.)

.181
(227.)
.103
(48.)

.0827
(100.)
.0389
(29.)

4.742
(332.)
4.624
(. 77)

.208
(181.)
.201
(36.)

4.972
(340.)
4.924
(386. ~
4.798
(218.)
4.666
(251.)

Intercept

A.

By OJrrent

Rural

wanen:
Urban

Rural
By

R2

-.118
(75.)
-.0539
(23.)

77,320

.4130

42,130

.0638

.0547
(48.)
.0246
(5.53)

-.0813
(36.)
-.0270
(3.43)

38,144

.4656

4,734

.2279

.191
(185.)
.190
. (192.)

.0831
(73.)
.0699
(73.)

-.121
(53.)
-.0969
(57.)

37,330

.4858

82,12Q

.3191

.205
(118.)
.213
(135.)

.0589
(34.)
.0487
(33.)

-.0892
(24.)
-.0706
(25.)

15,451

.47195

27,429

.4050

Residence

Men:
Urban

n.

SaJrple
Size

Experience

5.029

Regim of Birthplace

Men:
Urban

Rural

wanen:
Urban

Rural

Sruroe: Dita are frau the fair percent public use sanple C?f the Colanbian 1973. census of -~at.ion. '!he deperdent variable is
the natural logaritlnn of JOOnthly eamm;JS of .imividuals in pesos. Urban areas of resideme are cabeceras or COlD1ty seats in the
900 municipaliti.3S arrl other urban areas. Birthplaces are only identified by m.micipality. 'Brus, it is not kncMn whether a
pP.rson w.:-s !:or.1 .in &'I u.rt..dn or ;\ rural area or whethm· the location of the birth was the family's usual residence. Here it is
assurred that persons born in municipalities with a cabeoera lai:ger than 35,000 inhabitants in 1973 were born in an "urban area,"
arrl otherwise they are attriwted to a rural birthplace category. see Schultz (1983) arrl Fields arrl Schultz (1982) for further

description of data.
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urban and rural areas.

Estimated private returns to schooling for men who

reside in rural areas appear to be about one half as large as for men in urban
areas, 10 as contrasted with 18 percent.

This pattern of lower returns to

schooling in the rural sector is frequently noted and often attributed to the
lesser quality of rural schools (Behrman and Birdsall, 1983) or to the less
dynamic technology of traditional agriculture that creates fewer opportunities
for the educated worker to recoup his investment (Jamison and Lau; 1982).
Correspondingly, the slope of the earnings profile with respect to
post-schooling experience, that is interpreted by Mincer (1962, 1974) as a
return to on-the-job training, is substantially lower within rural than within
urban residential strata of Colombia.

These differences are equally evident

among employees and the self-employed male workers in Colombia (Fields and
Schultz, 1982: Table 6).

Smith (1983) finds similar rural-urban differences in

returns to post schooling experience in Malaysia based on longitudinal data.
The explanation may be fewer opportunities to accumulate on-the-job training
and work experience that raise the workers' subsequent earnings in traditional
agriculture compared with those experiences available in the urban economy.
But about half of the men born in rural areas of Colombia had migrated to
urban areas by 1973, and half of those residing in urban areas in 1973 were
born in rural areas.

Categorizing the workers by whether they were born in a

municipality with an urban center (i.e. a town over 35,000 in 1973) or
otherwise in a rural area, leads to the second panel of stratified income
equation estimates.

Ignoring the relocation costs of migration, the private

returns to a year of schooling for the rural born are now virtually identical
to those earned by the urban born, namely 19.0 and 19.1 p~rcent, respectively.
The slope of the income experience profile is also much more similar between
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rural and urban birth cohorts than it was between rural and urban resident
populations .

Thus, almost half of the gains to rural schooling is obtained

through migration to urban areas of Colombia.
Other studies of earnings in Colombia document that rural migrants are not
disproportio nately among the unemployed upon arrival.in.t he cities.

Indeed~

the immigrants overtake the earnings of the native city-born workers within
five years of their arrival, holding constant for their education, age, and
sex. (Ribe, 1979).

Yap (1977) found a similar tendency for rural-urban

migrants in Brazil, where they achieve income parity with city natives in less
than a decade.

These studies are parallel to the extensive evidence that

immigrants to the U.S. progressive ly close the earnings gap they initially
confront in competition with U.S. natives, and reach income parity after about
a decade (B. Chiswick, 1978).

Estimates of the private return to rural

schooling for men are seriously biased downward in Colombia when analysis is
restricted to persons remaining in the rural sector.

Analyses focused on

regional or rural populations subject to large net outflows of migration may
contain similar biases, as in Colombia.

The magnitude of this bias in

educational returns within the rural sector in developing countries warrants
more study.29/
Alternative ly, if many local markets are aggregated to include possible
migratory destinations , and thereby approximate a closed population, returns to
schooling can also be biased by the omission of regionally relevant factors
(Birdsall and Behrman, 1984).

For example, geographica l variation in the cost

of living, the quality and private cost of schooling, migration costs, and
region-spec ific income reporting problems may all deserve explicit attention in
the aggregate, but may be more easily neglected in some stratified samples.
Because the perfect single capital and labor market underlying Mincer's (1974)
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equilibrium model for the earnings function is not entirely realistic,
modifications may be made in the list of conditioning variables, while the
levels of aggregation should correspond as closely as possible with the birth
cohort which proceeds to obtain specific amounts and qualities of schooling.
Since the rate of rural-urban migration and its educational selectivity
differs substantially from Latin America to South Asia and Africa, to East Asia
and the Middle East, there is no reason for the rural-urban migration effects
evident in Colombia to be universally replicated.

Some areas of traditional

agriculture may not have off-farm opportunities open to the educated.

For the

same reason that Eckaus (1973a) found private returns to education low within a
sufficiently narrow US occupation, private returns to schooling among day labor
in rural India for relatively unskilled agricultural tasks may also be low,
unless mobility is allowed for.

The private returns to schooling for the

landless in these circumstances may reside in the ability of the more educated
to gain access to other forms of employment and possibly exit the rural sector
altogether.

Care must be exercised in constructing comparison groups,

therefore, to evaluate the returns to education including the full range of
economic opportunities open to the more and less educated.

Following a birth

cohort or school-class cohort provides one way to minimize the sample selection
bias that mobility may otherwise introduce.

Stratifications of samples along

the lines of regions, rural-urban areas, or occupations can all lead to
selection bias in estimating returns to schooling.

These sources of bias may

be particularly serious in the study of educational returns in low income
countries, as illustrated above with reference to Colombia.
Kale-Female Return Comparisons

If all men and women work the same time for wages, private market returns
to schooling could be calculated for each sex separately and readily compared.
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An efficient allocation of investment resources to the schooling of women and
men would then tend to equalize these sex-specific market returns, to the
extent that returns to schooling in nonmarket production within households were
of a similar magnitude for women and·men.

But women generally participate less

often and when they do participate they may work fewer hours in. the, market ...
labor force than do men (Layard and Mincer, 1985; Durand, 1975;. Standing,
1978).

Thus, the potential for a sample selection bias on this account would

appear more obvious in the case of computing returns to women's education than
in the case of men and add to our uncertainty.in comparing rates by sex.

But

the nature of this bias, if any exists, remains to b~ empirically documented in
the various cultural and economic regions of the world.
It is incorrect to assume that women gain less from schooling merely
because they spend fewer years after school working in the market labor force.
As shown in section V below, schooling also increases the productivity of
women's time in nonmarket production.

Demands for nonmarket production,

however, are limited by the extent of the household market, because the final
commodities produced in the household are largely untradeable.W

The tendency

for more educated women to allocate more of their time to market labor force
activities can be explained by both the relatively inelastic demand for
nonmarket output and the likelihood that education enhances specialized market
production skills more than education increases the value of the marginal
product of women's time in nonmarket production.

The family labor supply model

suggests that it is also appropriate to control in such comparisons for the
wage rate of the woman's husband or other family members and the nonearned
income of the family.31/

Because the value of other members' time and

nonearned income is likely to reduce the woman's market labor supply and be
positively correlated with her education, these controls specified by the
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partial effect of women's education on her market labor supply.

Moreover, this

empirical regularity may be strengthened further if unpaid family work that is
conventionally counted as being in the labor force.is ex~luded from our measure
of market labor supply.

Unpaid family worker status for.women is the least

satisfactorily measured aspect of labor supply across societies (Durand, 1975;
C. Chiswick, 1978; Hill, 1983) and it is precisely a labor· market transaction
within the family rather than in the labor market for which a shadow wage
cannot be directly observed.
Thus, given the sensitivity of women's market allocation of time to their
educational attainment, direct estimates of market returns to schooling
inferred from only women working for wages may well be unrepresentative of the
potential returns received by a representative woman in the population.32/
Here is an important issue for public policy, that has received surprisingly
little empirical study.
Griffin's (1985) analysis in the Philippines is an exception.

He considers

the earnings of married women in the Bicol region in 1980 to appraise how
robust estimates of schooling returns are to alternative methods for dealing
with this pervasive source of sample selection bias. He estimates jointly for
women outside the market labor force a nonmarket (reservation) wage function
and a market wage function for wage offers to those working.

The

selection-corrected model of Heckman's is plausibly identified within the
context of the family labor supply model.

Based on the conventional log linear

specification of the earnings function where returns to schooling are constant
across schooling levels, the selection-corrected estimate of schooling returns
is 18 percent, compared with the conventional estimate of 14 percent, baseid on
only the quarter of the sample who is working in the market labor force and
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reporting the requisite wage.

The selection correction is highly significant

statisticall y and certain features of earnings function change.

But based on a

single regional sample from a single country, it is not reasonable to draw any
general conclusions regarding the magnitude or even direction of this selection
bias on women's returns to schooling.
Conventiona l earnings function estimates of the private returns to
schooling for males and females that ignore the selected nature of the female
samples
1973).

are summarized in several papers (Woodhall, 1973; Psacharopou los,
The average of 16 country studies recently cited by Psacharopou los

(1985: Table 5) suggests that the uncorrected returns to women may be somewhat
higher than to men at the secondary level and overall, but marginally lower at
the primary and higher educational levels.

Because there is no g priori basis

to conclude that sample selection bias would necessarily alter these estimates
upward or downward, they must stand as the best evidence currently available.
In that light, a modest bias may exist in underinvesti ng in women's schooling
relative to men's on efficiency grounds, which is not inconsisten t with the
cross country comparisons of enrollments analyzed in section II.
area that needs further empirical research.

This is an

The family labor supply model

provides some guidance as to how corrections for the self-selecti on of women
into the market labor force can be reasonably identified by family wealth or
husband wage variables.
Traditional labor market institutions may segregate different groups of
workers by industry, occupation, or activity.

Though such arrangement s may

have had at one time relatively little effect on the efficient allocation of
labor, they may become increasingly inefficient as economic opportunitie s for
individuals change more rapidly with modern,econ omic.growth {Birdsall.an 4
Sabot, forthcoming ).

Women in particular may be caught in family enterprises
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technological economies of large scale in the organization of production.
Until women can acquire the requisite schooling and transferable skills to find
suitable employment in firms in expanding sectors of the modern economy, the
opportunity value of women's time relative to men's time may decline.
Fragmentary historical and anthropological evidence supports the view that
early industrialization reduced the relative value of women's contribution to
the household.

During later stages of industrialization the economic

contribution of women relative to men has increased (Boserup, 1970; Shorter,
1975; Goldin, 1980, 1983; T.P. Schultz, 1987b).

This cycle may be associated

with a change in the returns to schooling for women, but historical evidence to
test this hypothesis is not yet in hand.
Interactions with Educational Returns

If returns to education reflect in part the acquired general ability of
workers to profit from new opportunities, as emphasized by Welch (1970) and
T.W. Schultz (1975), then investments in enlarging the pool of locally relevant
technological options and other profitable resource reallocations should spur
the private returns to education.

This pattern of complementarity between

local research and development activity and the returns to schooling in
agriculture is a widely noted empirical regularity (Griliches, 1964; Huffman,
1974; Jamison and Lau, 1982; Evenson, 1986).
By the same reasoning, it is expected that agricultural extension activity,
while it raises productivity in specific agricultural functions, it would also
substitute for farmer schooling, diminishing the productive advantages enjoyed
by the more educated farmer in exploiting new specific opportunities.
Schooling's effect on nonmarket production may also be sensitive to the rate of
growth of knowledge in that specific area of nonmarket production.

As effort
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is expended to diffuse that specific knowledg e, the differen tial advantag e
enjoyed by the educated worker would eventua lly diminish .

The generali zed

knowledg e obtained by schoolin g substitu tes (imperfe ctly) for the specific body
of function al knowledg e dissemin ated by vocation al extensio n programs .
Rosenzw eig and Schultz- {1982) -found-t hat the effect:·of. ---mother -'-s -educati on in

reducing child mortalit y and·fer tility in Colombia was diminish ed.with
improvem ents in local health infrastr ucture.

Barrera (1986) examined child

height and height-f or-weig ht as measures of child health and nutritio nal status
in the Bicol region of the Philippi nes.

He found that gains associat ed with

mother's educatio n were larger in communi ties that lacked health
infrastr ucture.

In contrast , Strauss (1987) found evidence in a rural Ivory

Coast survey of complem entarity of mother's educatio n and local health
infrastr ucture, as they interact ively affected child height and
height-f or-weig ht.

T.P. Schultz (1971) and Rosenzw eig and Schultz (1985) found

in Taiwan and the U.S. that schoolin g of couples and local family planning
extensio n activity are substitu tes in their effect on fertilit y reductio n.
Consequ ently, the least educated gain the most from some types of
informat ion-exte nding programs , whether they provide farmers with new
agricult ural inputs or provide housewiv es with knowledg e of health practice s or
family planning techniqu es.

There would seem to be a basis, therefor e, for

analyzin g other research and developm ent and informat ion diffusio n and
extensio n programs to refine our understa nding of which activiti es increase or
decrease the private nonmark et and market returns to schoolin g.

It may be

noted that though extensio n activity may depress- private -returns to schoolin g,
they may still be an efficien t or cost effectiv e method to increase average
product ivity and to redistri bute income more equally.

Here again, more

empirica l docwnen tation of these patterns ,of substitut ion:._and complem entarity
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distributive implications of policy options that focus on educational
endowments and family welfare.W

The .pattern of.productive interactions

between education and the family's environment and endowments can be estimated
from reduced-form equations, and -.consequently do not depend on controver.sial
structural assumptions.
There appears to be an inverse empirical association·betw een fertility and
the resources parents provide each of their children, proxied generally by the
child's schooling.

An interaction between the quality (i.e. schooling) and

quantity (i.e. number) of children in the parents' budget constraint is a
widely accepted rationalization for this tradeoff between "quality" and
quantity of children (Becker and Lewis, 1974).

Alternatively, the empirical

relationship can be interpreted, without imposing a specific structure on the
budget constraint and family choice process, as indicating parents view child
quality and quantity as substitutes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980).

In either

case, estimating without bias the magnitude of this cross-substitut ion effect
is difficult, because both outcomes are endogenous to the family's lifetime
allocation problem. - What exogenous factor can be specified that shifts either
fertility or' the amount of schooling children receive, allowing the other
factor to then behaviorally adjust, but not be directly affected by the
identifying constraint?

Only in the natural experiment of "twins" are we

presented with a clear situation for evaluating the magnitude of this
quantity-qualit y substitution effect, and for rural India the data support the
economists' conjecture (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980).

This would imply .that

family planning programs that lower the cost of averting unwanted births shduld
encourage parents to invest more in the schooling of each of their children.
Conversely, extending effective compulsory ~chooling should be expected to
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Here then is another area in which public

policy, i.e. family planning, may induce greater investments in schooling,
presumably by raising the privately perceived rate of return to educating
children.
Efficiency and Equity

A recurrent theme in the literature on economics -of education is a
discussion of who benefits from the public subsidies extended to education
(T.W. Schultz, 1972).

This policy objective is more salient in low income

countries where the public subsidy to secondary and higher education can be
relatively large and these educational levels are filled by the children of the
upper class (Bhagwati, 1973).

For example, in 1962, the Colombian government's

operating expenses per public school student was five times greater at the
secondary than at the primary level, and fifty times greater at the higher
education level than at the primary level (T.P. Schultz, 1968: Table 8).

These

differentials tend to be smaller in South Asia and perhaps even larger in
Africa, because cost-of-living stipends are often provided to university
students.

The disproportionat e size of public subsidies for higher education

may have begun to decrease in some low income countries, but the inequities of
the current schemes for financing higher education remain clear in economic
terms (Minget and Tan, 1985). The distribution of public educational subsidies
is an area of increasingly active debate.

This concern with public financing

of education and its implications for equity as well as efficiency is outlined
later in section V; it is reviewed extensively in several recent studies
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, World Bank, 1986a).

-

_I

-76V.

Nonmarket Production and Schooling

While the effects of schooling on market earnings are relatively well
documented, though sometimes subject to uncertainty due to problems of
measurement and estimation, the evidence is more .recent--and fragmentary on the
returns to schooling in nonmarket production within the household (Michael,
1982; Haveman and Wolfe, 1984).
particularly important.

In low income countries these benefits .are

This review only surveys the evidence in this field.

Two other chapters of this volume also address health and fertility
consequence s of education (Behrman and Deolalikar, and Birdsall).
More educated workers tend to work more in the market labor force, holding
constant for other sources of family income and capital that may combine to
enhance their productivity in nonmarket production.

As noted earlier, a

married woman is likely to work less time in home production the.greater is her
education, given her husband's education and business capital.

This pattern

prevails in most low income surveys of urban areas and in rural areas where
off-farm employment opportunitie s for educated women are reasonably developed.
Thus, nonmarket production activities must be curtailed or at least substitutes
found for the educated woman's nonmarket time.

Nonetheless , most.studies

confirm increased home output in several quantifiable dimensions with a woman's
schooling, despite the fact that she may actually spend less time in the home.
Child mortality, for example, is lower for more educated mothers whether or
not family income or husband's wages and education are also held constant
(Cochrane et al. 1980; T.P. Schultz, 1980).

An additional year of mother's

schooling, in either rural or urban subpopulatio ns, is associated in many low
income countries with a 5-10 percent reduction in child mortality, regardless
of the tendency for these more educated women to reallocate their home time
toward market activities (Cochrane, et al., 1980).

By neglecting education's
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effect on rural-urba n migration and its consequen ces on child health, these
studies understat e the child health returns to rural schooling of girls (T.P.
Schultz, 1983).
Is this empirical associatio n of schooling and child mortality due to (1),,
the benefit of. the purchased health inputs obtained -from.,the mother's-a dded
market earnings, or (2) the enhanced productiv ity of her remaining time-at
home, or (3) her improved allocativ e efficienc y in using various health inputs,
given their prices?

Because the household 's nonmarket output--c hild health in

this case--is consumed directly by the couple, tastes or preferenc es of the
couple are relevant to productio n decisions , unlike the market sector where
profit maximizat ion alone determine s productio n decisions .

Consequen tly,

education might modify child health (and fertility) investmen ts by inducing a
change in tastes, holding constant prices, income and household technolog y
(Easterlin , Pollak and Wachter, 1980).

To disentang le efficiency , input

allocatio n, and taste effects of education on household productio n, the
household productio n technolog y must be separately identified and estimated
(Rosenzwe ig and Schultz, 1983).

Lack of sufficien t informatio n on this

technolog y has slowed progress toward understan ding precisely how education
affects nonmarket outcomes.

The total effect of schooling on the outcomes can,

nonethele ss, be estimated by reduced-fo rm like equations that embody both the
parameter s of the utility/de mand system and that of the household productio n
technolog y.
The associatio n between female education and fertility and contracep tive
behavior is analogous , but more complicat ed.

Education may permit a co~ple to

achieve more precisely their desired target level of fertility, given
uncontrol led biologica l reproduct ive capacity (i.e. fecundity ) .and other .random
events.

A simple associatio n is noted between schooling levels of women and
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cumulative number of births in recent sample surveys from 22 low-income
countries (United Nations, 1983).

Schooling of the women is positively

correlated with contraceptive knowledge and use in every country and between.,
every pair of (five) schooling levels, controlling for the woman's age and age
at marriage.

This descriptive regression study by the UN does not control,

however, for the household demand determinants, such as husband's income,
earnings, assets or land, which often exhibit a positive partial correlation
with fertility (T.P. Schultz, 1973; Mueller, 1984).

Since these income

variables tend to be positively correlated with wife's schooling, their
omission as controls for wealth from the above fertility regressions is likely
to weaken the reported inverse mother schooling-fertility association.
Regardless of this lapse in specification, the association was inverse in 20 of
the 22 countries.

Cochrane (1979), in an earlier review of the evidence,

reached similar conclusions, but stressed the non-monotonic simple association
between women's schooling and their fertility. She noted the tendency for
fertility, particularly in a few of the poorest rural populations, to increase
with basic primary schooling and only thereafter fall.

The unanswered question.

is, if controls were included for husband's wealth or land, whether the early
rising phase of fertility with the woman's education would have been mitigated
or eliminated, leaving a monotonic negative partial relationship of women's
education on fertility.
But to proceed further and assess how education affects nonmarket
production and thereby influences fertility requires the estimation of
contraceptive use and contraceptive efficiency equations, conditional on the
woman's schooling, the couple's endogenous demand for further births, and the
couple's biological fecundity inferred from past reproductive behavior and
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Better educated wives in Malaysia and the US appear to know more

about contraceptio n, and are able to use contraceptiv e methods more
efficiently .

The more educated couple is better able than a less educated one

to perceive their reproductive

propensities and effectively compensate by

means of birth control for these differences in f~cundity (Rosenzweig and
Schultz, 1985, 1987).
The investments of parents in the "quality" of children are difficult to
measure, but two outcomes of this nonmarket production process are the health
and schooling of the children.

Child mortality discussed above is the least

ambiguous indicator of child health investments by parents.

Schooling of the

children is frequently studied as another nonmarket outcome of the family, and
one in which the education of the mother often appears more important than that
of the father.

Evidence on these issues has been reported for the U.S. (Swift

and Weisbrod, 1965; Leibowitz, 1974, 1975; Hill and Stafford, 1974; Murnane, et
al. 1981), Philippines (King and Lillard, 1983), Malaysia (DeTray, 1987), and
India at the aggregate district level (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977).

The

empirical basis to generalize about the family-leve l determinants of child
schooling investments may depend on different regional configuratio ns of the
family and the distribution of child rearing responsibil ities between mother,
father and extended family.

It would be surprising, nonetheless , if parent

education did not help to explain offspring educational attainment, when
controls are included for local school facilities, parent assets, and wages
opportunit ies.W
The significance of nonmarket production effects of schooling, particularly
those associated with the education of women, should not be underrated as
factors shaping the development process.ill

A major research challenge is to

measure these effects of schooling on nonmarket production with greater
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precision and to begin to develop methods for measuring the value to these·'
effects in a way that is more or less commensurate with the estimates of
private market returns to schooling derived from wage functions .
. Nonmarket returns to schooling are not generally an additional benefit from
education over and above the market returns described earlier.

Nonmarket

production is usually obtained by foregoing market income and reallocating}:~ime
from market to nonmarket production.

Just as it is inappropriate to conclude

that women receive a low return on their schooling because they allocate only a
small fraction of their time after school to market work, it is incorrect to
attribute the market rate of return to their schooling and then additionally
credit their schooling with the noted nonmarket production gains, such as in
child health, child schooling, and birth control.W
To the extent that reductions in disease, decreases in fertility, and
increases in child schooling embody social externalities that benefit other
members of the society beyond the private family, then an externalities case
can be made for public subsidization of education that contributes to these
types of nonmarket production activities.

Current research on household

production suggests that female schooling may, according to this reasoning,
warrant a larger subsidy than male schooling.

But most of the benefits of

family health improvements, fertility control, and child schooling that are.
associated with female education are privately captured by families.

VI.

Policy

Public expenditures on education absorb between two and eight percent of
the GNP of most countries (World Bank, 1986a; p. 46).

The share of school aged

children is substantially larger in low income than in high income countries,
because the less developed countries have recently experienced rapid population
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This age composition may increase the GNP share of educational budgets

in low income countries, while the income elastic demand for schooling operates
in the opposite direction.

In reality, the share of GNP devoted to education

is on balance positively related to per capita income, but the relationship
explains little of the variance across countries (T.P. Schultz, 1985).

Many

poor SubSaharan African countries, for example, spend more than five percent of
their GNP on public education, whereas this is also the figure reported on
average for both the Western and Eastern European industrial countries.
Education is frequently the largest or second largest share of the public
budget, after defense, claiming between ten to twenty percent of the total
(World Bank, 1986a).

The efficient and equitable allocation of this relatively

large budget warrants careful scrutiny by economists.
The educational system influences in complex and subtle ways the long run
evolution of an economy and society; some of these channels of influence are as
yet poorly understood.

The interdependence among the levels and parts of the

educational system indicates the need to evaluate the long run implications of
expansion or change in priorities, for they will have ramifications at many
points in the public and private sectors (Hicks, 1965).

Enrollment levels at

primary, secondary and higher educational levels must mesh with each other,
and; as discussed in section II, the educational system is one of the largest
employers of educated workers in the economy.

If the demand for teachers

outruns the domestic supply, the rising cost of expanding the school system
hinders the achievement of long run goals.

Confronted by the complexity of the

educational system, forecasting manpower requirements of the economy and
dynamic educational planning models were developed in the 1960s as a guide to
policy in developing countries (Harbison and Myers, 1964; Bowles, 1969; Pyatt,
et al. 1983).

But forecasts of the derived demands for educated labor have
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technical specialities.

They have even been misleading in projecting the

distribution of enrollment demands among primary, secondary, vocational, and
higher education (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985).

Accumulating evidence

suggests that private returns to schooling are a useful alternative means for
monitoring imbalances between the supply of and demand for educated workers in
an economy. Although these estimates of returns are subject to all the
difficulties of measurement discussed in section IV, they nonetheless provide a
means for objectively describing the economic scarcity of many specific levels
of skills that the educational system produces.
Imbalances between the educational system and the developing economy have
been noted by policy advisors, but not all of them are empirically well
founded.

As public expenditures on education increased in the 1960s and 1970s,

overinvestment in education was attributed a role in creating unemployment
among the educated and encouraging the inefficient allocation of relatively
unskilled jobs to overeducated workers (Lewis 1962; Edwards, 1974; Edwards and
Todaro, 1974).

But these subjective interpretations of labor market conditions

were rarely confirmed by analyses of labor market surveys, where lifetime
unemployment was below average for the better educated workers (Gregory, 1980;
Berrry and Sabot, 1984), and wage differentials by education continued to
reveal substantial market returns to basic primary and general secondary
education (Table 6).

Where imbalances have occurred, the means of financing

higher education have frequently been a contributing factor as well as the
mechanisms used for rationing excess private demands for schooling.
In some countries higher education overexpanded and a "brain drain"
emerged, as in Colombia in the 1960s (T.P. Schultz, 1968).

To deal with the

international "brain drain", a variety of tax-transfer schemes were proposed
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labor mobility between nations are unclear because individual and state
objectives may conflict, and thus a coordinated international response never
materialized.

The methods of financing higher education may often account for

the instances of overexpansion in higher education.

Tuition fees are often

minimal and student living stipends are awarded only on the basis of merit or
examination.

The resulting public subsidies per student enrolled in higher

education have become sufficiently large that there is little likelihood that
the private sector will evolve complementary higher educational services, even
in the form of a low cost-low quality system.

Private returns to the student

admitted to the public higher educational system may, as a consequence, be
substantial, while the social returns are unjustifiably low. When domestic
university graduates can obtain employment abroad, as may be the case in
engineering, medicine and technical sciences, these job opportunities can
augment further the private returns to higher education.

Depending on the

level of remittances of the emigrants to their families and the likelihood that
they return home and bring with them enhanced productive skills and capital,
this form of publicly subsidized "brain drain" may erode further the realized
social returns to public expenditures on higher education.

The obvious

economic solution is to reduce the size of the public subsidy and allow student
fees to cover a larger share of the costs of higher education.

Scholarships

and educational loans awarded on the basis of family means can still achieve
redistributive objectives (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1969; T.W. Schultz, 1972;
Blaug, 1973; Fields, 1974a, 1974b; Psacharopoulos and Wood.hall, 1985; Tan,
1985; World Bank, 1986a).
In other countries, such as Brazil, the rapid pace and structure of
economic growth sustained unusually large returns to higher education in the
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1970s.

Public and private universit y enrollmen ts increased according ly

(Langoni, 1973).

Other countries , such as Taiwan, were reluctant to expand

general universit y education as rapidly as the private demand for enrollmen t
increased for fear of creating unemploym ent among its educated youth.

To deal

with the excess demand for higher education , college entrance examinati ons were
increasin g relied upon to ration access to the high quality public subsidize d
universit ies.

But in contrast to other Asian countries , lower quality private

schools were not allowed to expand and fill the gap.

Secondary school

graduates in Taiwan retake repeatedl y the college entrance examinati ons and
their failure to enter the labor force in the interim suggests that rationing
can be an inefficie nt mechanism for dealing with excess demands for schooling
(Academic Sinica, 1983).
Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the consequen ces of following quite different
education al expansion policies combined with alternativ e mechanism s for the
selection of students.

Starting from a similar base in the 1960s, both

countries achieved nearly universal primary education al attendanc e by the
1980s, but public and private secondary schools expanded more rapidly in Kenya
than in Tanzania with the introduct ion of substanti al school fees .in Kenya to
finance the secondary school systems.

Tanzania alternativ ely employed a

"meritocr atic" examinati on system to ration the excess demand for places in the
secondary school system.

These different responses to growing private demand

for secondary education allowed a larger share of the children of less-educ ated
parents to advance into secondary schools in Kenya than in Tanzania (Armitage
and Sabot, 1986).

In other words, the meritocra tic examinati on system screened

on character istics that the educated parents were willing and able to produce
in their offspring , either through greater investmen ts of own time and market
goods (including higher quality primary schooling ), or because of inherited
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Includi ng the seconda ry school fees in Kenya, the private rate of

in
return to seconda ry schooli ng was only margin ally lower in Kenya than
Tanzan ia (Knight and Sabot, 1985).

Conseq uently, the increas ed rate of

have
investm ent in seconda ry educati ons in Kenya compare d with Tanzan ia may
the 1970s,
contrib uted importa ntly to the more rapid growth enjoyed by Kenya in
a more
though other misguid ed econom ic policie s in Tanzan ia probabl y played
ons of
importa nt role in that country 's slower growth. The egalita rian intenti
than
the Tanzan ian merito cratic ratione d educati onal policy frustra ted rather
of
facilit ated interge neratio nal mobilit y and deterre d an efficie nt level
expansi on
schooli ng investm ent (Armita ge and Sabot, 1986). The market clearin g
ution of
of seconda ry schools in Kenya also contrib uted to a more equal distrib
ry
income among educati onal classes , as the relativ e wage premia for seconda
workers
school gradua tes has slowly diminis hed over time among younger Kenyan
(Knight and Sabot, 1981), analogo us to figure 3 (p. 16).

There are clear

and
advanta ges in terms of efficie ncy when some of the costs of seconda ry
lifetim e
higher educati on are borne by student s who will thereby gain higher
incomes .

a
Specia l means- tested financi al aids can then be designe d to achieve

wide distrib ution of subsidi zed educati onal opport unities .

If these financi al

sm
aids can be used by student s in either public or private schools , plurali
(and
might be maintai ned and desirab le compet itive pressur e exerted on public
private ) schools to improve their quality and efficie ncy.
(World
Schools in low income countri es are often observe d to be ineffic ient
Bank, 1986a).

Unfortu nately, the task of definin g and then measuri ng

valuati on
produc tive efficie ncy is complex , and require s agreem ent on (1) the
knowled ge
of outputs and (2) on the opportu nity cost of inputs, as well as (3)
at the
of the produc tion technol ogy that defines how the inputs are transfo rmed
margin into outputs .

Evidenc e cited in the educati onal literat ure to
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characteristics such as high dropout rates and low advancement rates (Fuller,

1986).

To interpret such evidence on efficiency requires a measure of student

productivity associated with exposure to various training regimes.

If returns

to education-fall at the margin after completing four -0r five years, it may not
pay all students to continue in school to obtain a primary or secondary
certificate.

It could be an efficient use of educational resources to train

partially many students, but graduate few.

The efficiency of a training regime

depends on the gains in labor market productivity produced in a birth cohort
passing through the schools, and on how much more public and private resources
are required to effect a change in the relevant retention and advancement rates
without altering the standards of the graduates that matter for the labor
market.

Clearly, collecting the necessary figures to measure efficiency in

schools is difficult.

I have not seen an analysis that defines, in this sense,

the optimal schedule of retention and advancement rates for any country's
school system.

This is not to say, however, that current regimes with low

attendance rates and frequent repetitions represent an efficient use of either
the student's or teacher's time.
Decentralized management of school systems could have advantages in setting
local enrollment goals and fixing programs priorities.

An orderly flow of

information to the central government would nonetheless be needed to
rationalize centralized educational subsidies and evaluate national progress.
Monitoring labor market returns to schooling may also be a function that is
best performed by the central government.

Student fees .might be retained to

fund local school initiatives, while centrally administered financial aids
would reduce differential access to schools across economic classes and regions
of a country.

Recommendations to increase sharply school quality in low income
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countries (World Bank, 1986a) need to be evaluated thoroughly (Zymelman, 1982,
1985).

Local communities may be better positioned than the central government

to evaluate the trade-offs between expanding enrollments and increasing the
quality of school offerings.

Nonetheless, ·there is an urgent need for more·

quantitative analysis of how effective schools ·are in-producing valuable-skills
in low income countries.
VII.

Conclusions

This paper has reviewed several themes in the economic literature on
education and development:

(1) intercountry evidence of how income, price, and

demographic constraints govern public expenditures on schools, (2) alternative
conceptual interpretations of.the relationship between education and income,
(3) uncertainties underlying the micro statistical evidence on the private and
social returns to schooling in the labor market, and finally (4) indications of
the returns to schooling in nonmarket production of child

health and

education, and fertility control.
To integrate these four themes has not yet occurred.

It would entail a

firm idea of the factors that initiated the modern disequilibrium in education.
What change in the institutional or technological environment created the
derived demands for more educated labor?

How did these conditions increase the

private returns to schooling, encouraging the increased investment of private
resources in schooling
world.

and public expenditures on education throughout the

As these resources in schooling increased, they enlarged the pool of

educated workers which operates, other things equal, to reduce returns to
schooling, until a new equilibrium rate of return is established that more or
less equals the opportunity cost of diverting public and private investment
from the formation of further physical capital.

It cannot be said, with any

precision, how far the expansion of education can expect to proceed in any
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decrease to "normal" levels. A dynamic model of both the demand for and supply
of educated workers is needed to answer these questions.

-Oiven the time lags

between production of students, their entry. into the labor force, and the
determination of their lifetime wage levels, ·it may be possible in the future
to use the historical record to· form estimates of a recursive-model of
education and development than could answer-questions such as.these.

The

challenge of the field is to clarify the origins and dynamic structure of such
a model of education and development, and though speculatory theory is
beginning to emerge (Lucas, 1985), we have a long way to go.
This paper surveys several limited empirical regularities and provides
economic frameworks to help interpret the meaning of these patterns, and to
focus attention on many unresolved problems in model specification and
empirical implementation.

It will prove impossible in practice to deal with

many of these complicating issues simultaneously, and hence assigning priority
to questions for further research reveals my intuition on which issues are most
important to advance our understanding of education in the process of modern
economic growth.
The wage function is a powerful device for swnmarizing data on individual
wages or earnings.

Even the most simplified semi-logarithmic wage function,

conditioned on years of schooling and a quadratic in postschooling years of
experience, accounts for a remarkable one-quarter to one-half of the log
variance in male wages across most national labor markets.

There are few

internationally replicated regularities in the social sciences that have this
descriptive power at the individual level, and also have the intuitive appeal
of providing a rough approximation of the market pecuniary rate of returns
earned from schooling, viewed as an economic investment in human capital.
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Once economists had developed a conceptual framework for inferring the
private rate of return to schooling, estimates of returns were derived for
different types and levels

of schooling and for different racial groups.

Returns to qualitative improvements in the educational system are also
estimated frequently, but findings. as to.' the -returns. to ~various ..:4imet1sions of.
school quality differ markedly across studies.

Returns to school quality are

approximated by measuring variation in schooling inputs per student across
schools in a single labor market.

Variation in input use is then related to

the earnings of pupils across regions, holding constant years of schooling
(e.g. Welch, 1966).

Since observed variation in years of schooling is

generally positively associated with the quality of schooling across schools,
the estimates of returns to school years tend to decrease as controls are added
to the wage function for the qualitative dimensions of the schools.

The more

parsimoniou s specificatio n of returns to only "years" of schooling implicitly
assumes that changes in years of schooling will parallel as in past changes in
quality, and measured returns capture both the prevailing quantity and quality
variation in the population.

When the single proxy for educational inputs

(i.e. years) is supplemented by other measures of input mixes, there is a basis
for predicting how changes in years of schooling and the input mix will
subsequently influence the earnings capacity of educated workers.
Wage and earnings functions stratified by sex reveal that relative wage
differentia ls by schooling are of about the same magnitude for women in the
labor force as they are for men.

Because the sample of women reporting wages

is not representati ve of all women in the population, a sample selection bias
could affect these estimates of schooling returns for women.

Too few studies

have addressed this important empirical issue to draw any firm conclusions .
Nor have many studies collected reliable data on the net earnings of
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self-employed workers and analyzed them appropriately to clarify whether
returns to schooling in this self-selected segment of the labor force are the
same as among employees.

Clearly farmers recoup substantial income from their

education, and there is no obvious reason why the self-employed in
nonagricultural activities should fare differently. But appropriate .statis~i~l
evidence is not yet in hand.
Finally, schooling raises the productivity of individuals in rionmarket
production.

The schooling of parents affects the level of home production of

health, nutrition, mobility, fertility control, and child schooling.
Decomposing the sources of these changes requires the identification and
structural estimation of household production functions and input demand
equations.

The gains in household production attributable to a mother's

schooling are important for social welfare and should not continue to be
neglected by economists.

The topic of this chapter will remain incomplete

until it is possible to clarify the origins and trace through the consequences
of these nonmarket returns to women's schooling.

A microeconometric framework

for such studies of household production and behavior has been proposed
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983).

Current progress in implementing such analyses

is limited by the scarcity of suitably detailed longitudinal or retrospective
household survey data for low income countries.
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-92in the
despite the fact that income (GNP) per capita in constan t prices grew
did in this
same period three times faster in the high income countri es than it
from
lowest income group of countri es. These illustr ative figures are drawn
1984,
World Develop ment Report 1984, World Bank Staff, Oxford Univer sity Press,
expecta 
Tables 1, 23, and 25. See also Preston 's (1980) compar isons of life
countri es.
tion across more uniform and reliabl e data from a smaller number of
There are differe nces between and limitat ions of such synthe tic summary
measure s of health and educati on. The schooli ng in high and low income
te
countr ies (as suggest ed in Tables 1 and 2) may be of increas ingly dispara
though the
quality , so the gap in quality -adjust ed years may not be decreas ing
r
gap in years is. Analog ously, the gap between the quality of life (howeve
underm ining
that is measure d) in high and low income countri es may be widenin g,
health and
consid eration of the expecta tion of life as an overall indicat or of
and years
vitalit y. There is also the bounded nature of both life expecta tion
that
of educati on which may imply a narrowi ng gap as many countri es aproach
bounda ry.
£/See explana tory footnot es to Table A-1.

l/ The most compre hensive compar ison of rate of return studies is that by
these
Psachar opoulos (1973, 1981, 1985). Differe nces in methodo logy across
return
summar ized country studies limits the precise compar ability of the
calcula tions.
~/The politic al process may not assign everyo ne's vote an equal weight,
appear to
howeve r. For example , urban popula tions in many low income countri es
ed rural
exercis e greater influen ce on public sector decisio ns than do dispers
public
popula tions (Lipton , 1977). Withou t data on the distrib ution of income,
l to
service s, or taxes across subgrou ps within countri es, it is not fruitfu
politic al
specula te further here on the distrib utiona l implica tions of how this
process works.
~/ Equatio n (11) may be rewritt en in logarith ms:
ln(E/P) - ln(S/P) + ln(T/S) + ln(C/T) + ln(E/C)
of
and regress ions would be calcula ted of the followi ng form at each level
schooli ng:

-93ln(E/P)
ln(S/P)
ln(T/S)
ln(C/T)

P11 + P12ln Y + P13ln Px
P21 + P22ln Y + P23ln Px
P31 + P32ln Y + fi33ln Px
fi41 + fi42ln Y + fi43ln Px

+ P14Z
+ fi24Z
+ P34Z
+ fi44Z

Ps1 + Ps2ln y + fi53ln Px + fi54Z
The adding up of component effects implies that
ln(E/C)

P1i

=.t
J-

~i

for i = 1, ... ,4.

!Q/ It may be argued that the use of foreign exchange (FX) rates in 1969-71 to
translate GNP from local currencies into the common unit of dollars gives
insufficient weight to nontraded commodities. The tendency is to exaggerate
differences across countries in real consumer income per adult. Recent work to
construct a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis for comparing incomes across
countries by Kravis, Heston and Summers (1982) is built on a sample of coun
tries for which price indexes were constructed and then generalized and revised
to apply to other countries by Summers and Heston (1984). For example, FX
translated GNP per adult is forty-three times larger in the U.S. than in India
in 1970, whereas the PPP real income per adult difference is only thirteen to
one. Consumer welfare may be better approximated by the PPP income deflator
and therefore the PPP deflated figures were used in reestimating the schooling
equations reported in this paper. In general, PPP income elasticities of
school expenditures increased by as much as a quarter, as would have been ex
pected since the sample variance in log PPP incomes is markedly less than the
variance in log FX incomes. Price elasticities were reduced somewhat, suggest
ing that some of the differences in the relative price of teacher salaries are
captured in the PPP adjustment procedure. No systematic changes occurred in
the coefficients on relative size of school aged cohorts, nor were the esti
mated effects of urbanization noticeably changed by this substitution of one
measure of real GNP for the other. Substantive conclusions were not par
ticularly sensitive, therefore, to this choice of procedure for translating GNP
across countries into common welfare units.

ll/ The disturbances in the equation determining current demand for schooling
that would affect today's wages of teachers might also be correlated with the

-94unexplained disturbances in the equation determining enrollment rates ten years
earlier, such as might arise from a persistent country-specific unobserved
effect. This form of error structure would imply that the lagged enrollment
variable was not actually exogenous to the wage equation. The two-stage esti
mates based on the lagged enrollment instrument would then be subject to the
classical simultaneous equation bias and also would be inconsistent. Estimates
were calculated without the lagged enrollment as an instrument and the
coefficient estimates of the price elasticities did not change appreciably,
though their standard errors tended to increase. See also footnote 13 below.
WAn analogous errors-in-variable bias occurs in the study of labor supply,
where earnings are divided by hours worked to obtain a wage rate that is
specified by theory as a determinant of hours.
13 /The implicit primary and secondary school logarithmic wage equations for
teachers were estimates as conditioned on the secondary school enrollment rate,
income per adult and proportion of the population urban, all of which ex
planatory variables were evaluated ten years earlier:
ln WPt = -1.84 - .349 ln Est-lO + .355 ln GNP/At-10
(4.30)
(3.38)(6.22)

- .808U
(2.67)

n = 186
-.931 - .646 ln Est-lO + .305 ln GNP/At-10 - l.25U
(3.22)
(2.61)
(8.25)
(1.18)
n = 139

R2 - .601

where Est-lO refers to the secondary school enrollment proportion ten years
ago, GNP/At-10 indicates GNP per adult (age 15 to 65) measured ten years ear
lier, Ut-10 is the urban proportion of the population ten years ago, and Wpt or
'Wst are the school current expenditures per primary or secondary school teacher
divided by GNP per adult today.
Wwealthier countries may have lower labor force participation rates in ages
15 to 24, in part because the returns to schooling are relatively attractive
for these youth. Thus, this available productive resource of the time of
students is being saved and invested, though it is not fully counted in
national income accounts. At the other end of the life cycle, wealthier

-95countries tend to report lower participation rates, at least for males after
age 55. In other words, earlier retirement from the market labor force occurs
at higher income levels. The time of the elderly is also a productive resource
available to the society, but it is used increasingly for direct consumption
(e.g. leisure) as per capita incomes rise. The bias in my measure of GNP per
adult arises because the market value of leisure in retirement and the time of
students is not included in GNP and thus differentially understates the real
value of national factor income in wealthier societies that invest in more
schooling and consume more of their life cycle budget of time in retirement
activities.
illFrom equation (6) the coefficient on the relative price or teacher wage
variable in the expenditure function is b2 - a(~+ 1), and thus the estimated
price elasticity,~= (b2/a) - 1. The sample mean of a is .82.
WEconomies of scale in producing school services might be distinguished at
three levels: (1) with the size of the national educational system, (2) with
the size of the school measured in terms of its number of full time teachers,
and (3) with the size of the teacher's span of control or student-teacher
ratio. The importance of (1) in primary and secondary school systems was as
sumed at the outset to be negligible. The number of primary schools is re
ported in the 1984 UNESCO Yearbook. If the system's average school size (i.e.
log of teachers per school) is added to equation (6), one might expect this
added scale variable to diminish the coefficient on urbanization, if larger ur
ban schools realized economies that reduced unit costs. In a sample of 60
countries for which these data are recently available, school size is associ
ated with greater expenditures per child due to higher teacher-student ratios
and higher current outlays per teacher. The coefficients on urbanization are
not reduced in magnitude by the addition of school size. Consolidation econo
mies, however, could remain important at the secondary level, but no data were
found to test this conjecture.
A plausible interpretation of this pattern would presume that there are
economies in using teachers in the larger scale urban schools and perhaps com
pensating amenities in urban areas that teachers value, such as attractive em
ployment opportunities for teachers when schools are not in session. In fact,
urban teachers are probably better trained than rural ones in most countries,

-96so qualitative ly one would expect to otherwise see higher teacher costs in
urban school systems.
Wstandardi zed test comparisons do confirm that spending far less per student
in low income countries is associated with lower standardized test scores
(Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). 'What-is-not clear is whether marginal gains from
additions to school quality and quantity that can be purchased with marginal
increments in educational expenditures raise the market wages of existing
students by more than the amount those resources would accomplish if they
extended education to a larger number of students as discussed in the next
section of the paper. One suggestive study that draws this conclusion for
Brazil is Behrman and Birdsall (1983).
lllReturns to education may not increase with modern economic growth because of
limited regional and occupationa l mobility rewarding individuals on the basis
of their skills and education. Public policies may also have failed to
encourage technologic al change through adaptive research and development . Fi
nally, the absence of competitive domestic factor and product markets, or
distorting trade and foreign exchange regimes, may have eroded the incentives
to invest in education or skewed the distribution of income so as to discourage
broadly based educational programs. These possibilitie s cannot be explored
here.
19/ There are several possible reasons for divergence. First, the model is fit
to a pooled combination of cross section data from several time periods, and
not to just the 1965-1975 time series changes within countries. Second, the
sample of countries for which the 1965-1975 comparisons can be performed is
more restricted than the sample used in estimating the model. A third reason
is, of course, the omission or misspecific ation of explanatory factors. On the
other hand, this test is less strong than it might appear, because it is based
on overlapping samples. Though the within country changes are not the basis
for the reported estimates, repeated observation s on these same countries do
represent about a fifth of the pooled cross section sample used for the
estimation of the original model.

-9720/rf there are additional private direct costs of schooling, these are assumed
to be offset by part-time employment by the student. Obviously, where students
incur large direct costs, private returns are overstated by n and conversely
where private stipends are available for all students, such as in Francophone
Africa for higher education, the private returns are understated in this
Mincerian earnings function. Clearly, this specification is a simple
approximation, which fits reasonably well many sources of data. Tests of
specification are rarely performed but some that have been reported do not
reject this semi-log form (Heckman and Polachek, 1974).
21/rf z had a proportionate effect, a3, on wages in equation (11), its omission
would bias the OLS estimate of r to the extent that z ands were partially
correlated in the sample, i.e. cov(z)/var(s) >o. Thus, if z were height and
cov(z,s) were zero, the bias due to omitting a factor affecting wages would not
affect estimates of educational returns. Alternatively, if more able
individuals in each birth cohort were selected to obtain more schooling,
cov(z,s) > 0, and more able workers received higher wages given schooling, the
omission of ability from the wage equation (11) would bias upward the OLS
estimate of r due to the misspecificatio n of the wage equation by
a3cov(zs)/var(s ) (Griliches, 1957, 1977).
Wif the labor supply equation is jointly estimated with the wage equation,
the gain in earnings associated with education can be decomposed into direct
wage effects plus income and compensated wage effects on labor supply. The
case could be made for focusing analysis on the direct wage and indirect income
effects of wages on hours as the benefits to education, holding constant for
the loss of leisure induced by the compensated change in relative wage. If the
income effect of the wage change is indeed zero, as is frequently estimated,
then the effect of schooling on wage rates is a satisfactory approximation for
the total private market benefits to schooling.
Cases have been described in the literature, such as Brazil in the 1960s
and 1970s, where rapid modern economic growth created large rents for well
educated workers. Before the rapidly expanding educational system of Brazil
could catch up to these demands for higher educated workers, the private
returns to secondary and higher education reach high levels (Langoni, 1973;

W

-98Fishlow, 1973). But these rents were reduced among the younger birth cohorts·
whose relative supplies of schooling increased. High returns persisted,
however, for some older educated workers for whom the more plentiful young
educated workers were apparently poor substitutes. Conversely, foreign exchange
crises in Colombia were associated with depressed wage premia for younger
university graduates in Bogota in 1965 (Schultz, 1968). As the import
dependent modern sectors of Colombia revived in the late 1960s and 1970s,
private returns to university training rebounded (Psacharopoulos, 1981; Fields
and Schultz, 1982). The point is that the business cycle may perturb
substantially the apparent cross-sectional returns to schooling in the short
run (Kniesner et al., 1978), while the appropriate criteria for a long-run
human capital investment should be returns averaged over short-run business
cycles and not confounded with other short run changes that occur cyclically,
such as changes in the relative size of birth cohorts entering the labor force
(Freeman and Bloom, 1985).
lliMincer introduced the logarithm of weeks worked to explain the logarithm of
annual earnings (1974: Table 5.1, p. 92). This specification should be avoided
except where weeks worked is treated as endogenous and estimated suitably.
WJob turnover and quit behavior is also a decreasing function of education
for men and women (Weiss, 1984; Kiefer, 1985; Donohue, 1985). These aspects of
job search and mobility might be interpreted as increasing the private returns
to schooling. Social returns might also be realized if the labor market in the
aggregate sustained a lower level of turnover as schooling levels increased.
Private returns may thus differ systematically over the business cycle with the
changing distribution and level of unemployment (Kniesner et al., 1978).
WAnother serious problem is the treatment of unpaid family workers.

This

group should be imputed wages for their labors in family enterprise. Kuznets
(1959, 1966) made various working assumptions to estimate factor shares. C.
Chiswick (1977) has proposed a method that uses the survey detail available ~t
Other studies examine income distributions and impute an
opportunity value to the time of unpaid family workers. (Fishlow, 1972, 1974).
However, even if a satisfactory wage could be imputed to unpaid family workers,
the household level.

few data sets report the number of hours these workers contribute to family
enterprise.

See for example C. Chiswick, 1973.
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WFor example Armitage and Sabot (1986) report an interestin g analysis of wage
relationsh ips in the manufactu ring sector of Tanzania for men and women. In
this country in 1967 this elite sector employs 1 percent of the male labor
force and .05 percent of the female labor force. Can one assume the same type
and magnitude of selection bias would be present for men and women, so that the
evidence of wage differenc es in manufactu ring between men and women could be
accepted as indicativ e of broader patterns in sex difference s in wages.
WPrice levels tend to be higher in urban than rural areas primarily because
of housing and food prices. Health and education al services that are publicly
provided may be an exception to this pattern. There are few countries where
regional price indices are readily available over time.
WThe average private returns to schooling of Colombian women summarize d in
Table 7 are much less sensitive than were those for men to the migration bias.
This is probably due to the much greater female market labor force participa 
tion in urban than rural areas of Colombia, (i.e. 25 versus 10 percent of the
women over age 25 to 54), whereas for men at these ages the differenc e in labor
force participa tion is negligibl e between urban and rural areas (Schultz, 1981:
Table 7.5). Birdsall and Behrman (1984) control for origin and destinatio n
effects on earnings in Brazil and find different results. It is difficult for
me to interpret their findings, although Brazil is different from many
countries in having large differenc es between rural and urban areas in the
northeast and elsewhere in the country.

W The extent of the market" limits the amount of human capital individua ls
11

invest in themselve s, according to Becker (1964, p. 52). Because women often
prepare to work both in the home and market, they are less likely to invest as
do men in specialize d market skills. The limitation s of the household market
circumscr ibe the opportuni ties for specialize d investmen ts open to women, and
help to account, in Becker's view, for fewer US women than men graduatin g from
college (p. 101).
illThe family labor supply model is based on the household demand framework
where the wife's labor supply is condition ed on the wage rate of her husband or

-100other family members, the family's nonearned income, and an exogenous proxy for
her permanent wage opportunities (e.g. education and age). Ashenfelter and
Heckman (1974) examine only couples for whom the wife and husband work for a
wage, and they simply treat her actual wage as though it were exogenous. The
papers edited by Smith (1980) explore other procedures for dealing with sample
selection for wage earners and wage imputation for nonworking women.
WThe direction of such a bias is not prescribed by the selection model and
empirical evidence is scarce. Suppose an unobserved trait, called taste for
market production, influenced positively the likelihood that a woman is
observed to work for wage and to get an education. Then the direct correlation
of education and wages among working women will be upward biased even if this
taste has no independent effect on labor productivity. But if women's
education increases the likelihood that they will retire from the labor market
when their children are of preschool age (Leibowitz, 1975), then the bias could
change direction at different stages in the life cycle.

W

Caldwell (1979), for example, believes that in Africa the provision of
health facilities widens differentials in health status by education class, for
only the educated mothers know how to use effectively the over burdened public
health facilities.

Mt/This intergenerational effect of education could be interpreted as arising
from at least three distinct mechanisms: a genetic component of ability proxied
by education, a disproportionate productivity in educating one's child, and an
acquired taste for having children become like oneself.
35/other nonmarket benefits not considered here are in spouse selection and
subsequent marital stability (Becker, et al. 1977; Boulier and Rosenzweig,
1984; Montgomery, 1985).

Reduced marital dissolution might also influence
child investments. The reduction in crime (Ehrlich, 1975) is often cited as a
source of private and social gains. Political behavior and the functioning of
democracy are also often linked to schooling as are the social benefits of a
more equal personal distribution of income.
of this paper.

These issues were beyond the scope

-10136/This would appear to be the implication of Woodhall (1973) and
Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985) where the nonmarket effects are cited as
added support for the very high returns to women's schooling.
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